Essays in financial economics by Ricca, Bernardo
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Essays in Financial Economics
Bernardo Ricca
Thesis submitted to the Department of Finance of the London School
of Economics and Political Science for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
April 2019
Declaration
I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the
London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than
where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent
of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted,
provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced
without my prior written consent.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the
rights of any third party.
Statement of inclusion of previous work
I can confirm that chapter 3 is a result of previous study for an MRes in Finance
which I undertook at the London School of Economics and Political Science and
completed in 2015.
Statement of conjoint work
I confirm that chapter 2 is jointly co-authored. I contributed 33% of the work for
chapter 2.
I declare that my thesis consists of 38,000 words.
Acknowledgement
I would like to thank my supervisor Daniel Paravisini for his invaluable support
and guidance. I learned immensely from our continuous interactions throughout
these years. I am deeply grateful to Daniel Ferreira and Vicente Cuñat. Their in-
sight, support and encouragement were crucial throughout my PhD. I also benefited
from discussions with other faculty members, specially Dirk Jenter, Mike Burkart,
Ulf Axelson, Ashwini Agrawal, Juanita Gonzalez-Uribe, and Moqi Groen-Xu. Thank
you for your insights and generosity.
I thank the London School of Economics for the financial support.
I am grateful to my PhD colleagues at the LSE and other universities. I thank
Lorenzo Bretscher, Lukas Kremens, Olga Obizhaeva, Brandon Han, Dimitris Pa-
padimitriou, Francesco Nicolai, Su Wang, Gosia Ryduchowska, Marco Pelosi, Fab-
rizio Core, Simona Risteska, Alberto Pellicioli, James Guo, Petar Sabtchevsky, Una
Savic, Yue Yuan, Friedrich Geiecke, Flavio Moraes, Felix Vetter, and Alexsandros
Cavgias for their help and friendship over the years. You were always happy to
discuss my research and teach me Finance and Economics. I am specially grateful
to my co-authors and friends Jesús Gorrín and José Morales.
I am deeply grateful to my family. I thank my parents Hercules and Marcia, my
brother Guilherme, my grandparents Vandira, Jose and Hercules, my wife Camila,
and my little daughter Maria. I would not be able to complete this journey without
your support, patience and love.
Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays in financial economics. In the first chapter, I
test for the existence of a new channel through which politicians can exchange fa-
vors with campaign donors: different payment periods in procurement contracts. I
explore an electoral reform that bans corporate contributions. The reform partially
breaks down the relationship between donors and politicians: firms that donate in
the previous election can no longer commit to contributing with the same intensity
in the next election. Using a within-firm difference-in-differences identification strat-
egy, I find that the payment period to firms that donate to the coalition government
increases by five days after the reform. I study the heterogeneity of this effect and
find that it is larger in municipalities with low liquidity and for contracts allocated
through competitive procurement methods. The results provide an explanation –
preferential treatment after the bidding stage – for the persistent evidence of quid
pro quo even in competitive auctions. Moreover, the results point to the importance
of designing rules that curb discretion over payment periods.
In the second chapter, co-authored with Jesús Gorrín and José Morales, we study
the trade effects of increases in violence following the Mexican Drug War. A focus
on exports allows us to control for demand shocks. We compare exports of the
same product to the same country of destination, but produced in municipalities
with different exposure to violence after a close electoral outcome. We show that
municipalities that are exogenously exposed to the Drug War experience a 45%
decrease in export growth on the intensive margin. Large exporters suffer larger
effects, along with exports of more complex, capital-intensive, and skill-intensive
products. Finally, we provide evidence consistent with violence increasing marginal
exporting costs.
In the the third chapter, I study tax and redistributive policies in a dynastic
model that features borrowing constraints, occupational choice and preferences for
bequests. Borrowing constraints arise from moral hazard. In the absence of taxes, in-
dividuals that start with different levels of wealth converge to different steady-states,
and poverty traps may occur. The introduction of inheritance taxation creates a
trade-off: on the one hand, they tighten borrowing constraints, and thus they de-
plete the short-run aggregate productivity of the economy; on the other hand, they
can be an instrument to fight poverty traps, wealth inequality and, in some cases,
maximize long-run aggregate productivity.
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Chapter 1
Procurement payment periods and
political contributions: evidence
from Brazilian municipalities
Bernardo Ricca1
1.1 Introduction
Governments have increasingly adopted procurement methods that foster com-
petition.2 Competitive procurement mechanisms are designed not only to improve
efficiency but also to reduce the scope for corruption. Yet, the evidence of quid
pro quo persists even in competitive auctions. For instance, campaign donors are
more likely to win contracts in auctions with multiple tenders (Baltrunaite, 2018).
One possible explanation is that some firms receive preferential treatment after the
tendering process, which gives them an advantage at the bidding stage. I test for
the existence of a particular dimension through which politicians can benefit firms
that make campaign contributions: shorter payment periods.
1I thank Daniel Paravisini, Daniel Ferreira, Vicente Cuñat, Ashwini Agrawal, Juanita Gonzalez-
Uribe, Dirk Jenter, Mike Burkart, Moqi Groen-Xu, Flavio Moraes, Lukas Kremens, Jesus Gorrin,
Felix Vetter, Alexsandros Cavgias, and seminar participants at the LSE, Insper and Universidad
de Los Andes for their helpful comments.
2Public procurement is a relevant activity. In 2015, among OECD countries, 29.1% of govern-
ment expenditure was done through public procurement. In the same set of countries, government
procurement amounts to 11.9% of the GDP. See OECD (2017).
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The notion of payment period, defined as the time between the delivery of a good
or service and the payment, is closely related to the concept of trade credit, which
describes loans in kind between transaction parts. In this setting, whenever a firm
agrees on a contract with the government, it also agrees that it will be paid after the
delivery, in effect granting a short-term loan to the government. A recent empirical
literature shows that trade credit terms have important real consequences for firms.
Changes in payment terms affect firms’ liquidity, employment, trade relationships
and probability of default, and effects are larger for firms that are more financially
constrained. Changes in payment terms at the industry level affect decisions such as
entry.3 The importance of payment terms in the context of public contracts has also
been acknowledged by governments. In recent years, new regulations and initiatives
were implemented in an attempt to shorten payment terms, especially to firms that
are considered small and financially weaker.4 In addition to being relevant to firms,
payment periods have an important characteristic: they are an objective quantity
for which measurement is straightforward. It is often difficult to determine the
precise economic value of favors that politicians grant to firms. Earlier payment is
an unambiguous advantage that can be easily translated into a monetary value.
I study payment periods in public procurement contracts with local governments.
In Brazil, government agencies can only pay their suppliers once the object of the
contract is delivered and verified, that is, once the agency acknowledges that the
supplier delivered the good or service according to specifications. Trade credit terms
are in general homogeneous: in most cases, agencies must pay within 30 days fol-
lowing the verification. Nevertheless, governments have discretion over the actual
timing of payment. The amount due is the same if payment occurs in the beginning
or at the end of the 30-day period.5 Late payments are common and suppliers are
not properly compensated for delays.6
3See Barrot (2016), Barrot and Nanda (2018) and Breza and Liberman (2017).
4For instance, see the QuickPay initiative, launched in 2011 in the US, and the Regulation 113
of the Public Contracts Regulations, passed in 2015 in the UK.
5This type of trade credit contract is known as ‘net terms’ and differs from contracts known as
‘two-part terms’, in which the seller offers a discount if the payment occurs within a determined
period.
6After the 30-day period, the amount due can be adjusted by inflation and a late payment
interest rate. However, these adjustments are rare, and even when they are paid, they are smaller
than the cost of capital for these firms and do not compensate for the liquidity risk they cause.
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I investigate whether this flexibility in speed of payment is a source of favoritism.
It is not clear that this should be the case. In some circumstances, awarding the
contract at a favorable price is the obvious way to help a donor. However, in cases
in which the tendering process is truly competitive, the government’s commitment
to paying more quickly might constitute an important advantage. Favored firms
can outbid firms that are otherwise similar, driving away non-favored firms from
participating in and winning procurement auctions. Other cases in which the pay-
ment period can be relevant are when the firm is in financial distress or when the
municipality is liquidity constrained. In the former case, the value of cash can be
very large. In the latter case, the municipality has to choose the subset of suppliers
that will be paid on time or, more likely, with a smaller delay. Because firms are
not fully compensated for payments that take place outside trade credit terms, late
payments can also be interpreted as a haircut. Therefore, governments choose which
firms bear the highest haircuts.
Using detailed administrative data on the budget execution of the municipalities
of the state of São Paulo, I am able to observe, at a granular level, amount purchased,
payment dates and the dates when the government agencies acknowledge that the
object of the contract was delivered (the verification date). I compute payment
periods as the time between the payment date and the verification date. Because
there is some discretion in the verification of services and construction, I focus
the analysis on simple products for which the verification date is a good proxy for
the delivery date. I explore whether political connections, measured by corporate
political donations to the coalition government in municipal elections, are associated
with speed of payment. The decisions of whether to donate, where to donate, and
to which party are endogenous. Therefore, estimates of cross-sectional or panel
regressions can only be interpreted as partial correlations.
I explore a set of electoral reforms that change the relationship between donors
and politicians. In 2015, corporate donations were banned and campaign spending
limits were imposed. Firms donate during election campaigns, which take place
every four years in Brazil. The electoral changes happened in the middle of the
mayoral term, implying that firms that donate in the previous election are not able
14
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to donate again in the coming election.7 In other words, firms can no longer commit
to funding political campaigns with the same intensity as before. If politicians’
incentives to grant favors to donors depend on the prospect of raising funds from
them in future campaigns, the reforms should be associated with less favoritism.
Electoral reforms of this type are not exogenous. They coincide with an in-
creasing anti-corruption sentiment and are initiated by demands of society rather
than by politicians. In the case of Brazil, a large anti-corruption probe uncovered
a widespread bribery scheme in which companies exchanged donations for public
contracts. Several members of the business and political elite were prosecuted.
Companies involved in the case had to pay sizeable fines and experienced financial
distress. In such situations, stakeholders can withdraw from doing business with
firms that are potential targets of the investigation.8 Therefore, the reforms can
coincide with changes in other variables that affect the prospects of politically con-
nected firms. Regressions that try to assess the impacts of the reforms and do not
account for time-varying shocks at the firm level can provide biased results.
To overcome this issue, I explore the fact that, in the last elections when dona-
tions were allowed, firms chose to donate in some municipalities but not in others.
Thus, in municipalities where a firm donated in the previous election, the relation-
ship with the local politician is shaken after the reforms, while in municipalities
where it did not donate the relationship is unchanged. This allows me to use the
trajectory of the same firm in a different municipality as a counterfactual. More
formally, I am able to control for firm-time fixed effects and implement a within-
firm difference-in-differences strategy around the reforms. This strategy guarantees
that the estimates capture the effect of the change in the relationship with the lo-
cal politician that is caused by the reforms, and not the effect of changes in other
non-observable variables that coincide with the reforms and affect differently donors
versus non-donors. I show that, after the reforms, payment periods to connected
7CEOs and board members can donate as individuals, but the donation is limited to 10% of
their annual income. Moreover, spending limits were imposed, ruling out the possibility of complete
substitution of corporate donations for individual donations.
8This withdrawal can happen for reputational reasons. For instance, a bank or a supplier does
not want to be linked with a firm that could be charged for corruption in the future. But it could
also happen for economic reasons. Potential targets of the investigation might have to pay large
fines in the future, which could affect their solvency.
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firms increase by five days. I perform an estimation of the monetary value of this
effect. It ranges from 0.31% to 0.61% of the total amount purchased from connected
firms. I run the same regression in the previous mayoral term, when there is no
change in electoral rules, and show that the effect is not driven by features of the
political cycle. I also test for the impact on the amount purchased. Effects are
negative and large (decrease of 17%), but not statistically significant. A possible
reason for the lack of statistical significance is that the amount purchased is not the
ideal variable to test favoritism. Contracts can be awarded before the reform and
executed over the next 12 months. Therefore, amount purchased is stickier than
speed of payment.
I then study the heterogeneity of the effect across municipality characteristics.
I show that effects are large, around 12 days, in municipalities with lower liquidity.
This evidence supports the idea that payment periods are more relevant when mu-
nicipalities face liquidity constraints.9 The effect is not statistically significant in
municipalities with higher liquidity.
Finally, I study heterogeneity across competitive and non-competitive procure-
ment methods. Competitive procurement methods refer to selection mechanisms
that involve a tendering process, while non-competitive methods refer to direct
contracting. Effects are large, 11 days, for competitive methods, while for non-
competitive methods they are small and not statistically significant. The results
suggest that payment periods are an important dimension of favoritism when gov-
ernments find it less straightforward to benefit donors through the allocation of
contracts. Because I restrict the sample to products that have an “off-the-shelf”
characteristic, the cost of rigging an auction is high. The effects for amount pur-
chased are negative but not statistically significant for non-competitive procurement.
In the baseline estimation, estimated in the previous mayoral term when electoral
rules are unchanged, the effects for non-competitive procurement are positive. This
result provides some evidence that the amount contracted might be the relevant
channel of favoritism for non-competitive procurement.
9Because liquidity is correlated with other (observable and unobservable) municipality charac-
teristics, other mechanisms could drive the result. For instance, municipalities with lower liquidity
can have weaker institutions and higher levels of corruption.
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This paper relates to a growing literature on trade credit.10 Barrot and Nanda
(2018) investigate the effects of the QuickPay reform in the US. The reform reduces
from 30 to 15 days the time to pay to a subset of small firms.11 They find that treated
firms increase employment by 1.7%. In a country with more financial frictions, such
as Brazil, where firms are credit rationed or pay higher interest rates, effects are likely
larger. Barrot (2016) shows that stretched payment terms increase barriers to entry.
He explores a reform that limits payment terms to at most 30 days. In a competitive
environment, excess firm-specific liquidity risk cannot be incorporated into prices.
Therefore, long payment terms increase liquidity risk to financially weaker firms.
He finds that, following the restriction, the probability of default decreases by 25%.
Moreover, he finds that the entry of small firms increases. These results, when
applied to this setting, imply that more favorable payment terms to donors affect
the ability of non-donors to compete. Breza and Liberman (2017) study the effects
of a policy that constrains the maturity of trade credit that a subset of suppliers can
extend to a large retailer. They find that trade with affected suppliers decreases in
comparison to non-affected suppliers, and that vertical integration increases. The
effects are larger for financially constrained firms. They also find evidence that firms
use longer payment periods to assess the quality of products.12
While the trade credit literature studies the effects of changes in trade credit
terms, this paper focuses on payment periods in a context where trade credit terms
are relatively homogeneous. I highlight, for public procurement, one aspect of the
relationship between the transaction parts – connections established though cam-
paign donations – that affects the effective maturity of trade credit contracts. The
fact that the effect is larger when the municipality (the buyer) has lower liquidity
10See Biais and Gollier (1997), Burkart and Ellingsen (2004), Costello (2014), Cuñat (2006),
Fisman and Raturi (2004), Giannetti, Burkart and Ellingsen (2011), Klapper, Laeven and Rajan
(2012), Murfin and Njorge (2015), Ng, Smith and Smith (2002), and Petersen and Rajan (1997),
among others. See also Cuñat and Garcia-Appendini (2012) for a review of the literature.
11The definition of small varies per industry. In terms of number of employees, the upper limit
varies between 100 and 1500 employees.
12This fact could challenge the main results in the following sense: after the reforms, when
the relationship between donors and politicians breaks down, politicians have to worry about the
quality of products supplied by donors and thus use stretched payment terms to assess product
quality. However, this is not a major concern in this setting because I measure payment period
as the time between payment and the date when the government acknowledges that the good was
delivered according to contract terms.
17
Chapter 1
and therefore is delaying payments squares with the idea that suppliers are better
equipped to extend trade credit if the relationship with the buyer is valuable and
difficult to replace (Cuñat, 2006).13
This paper builds on the literature that studies the effects of political connec-
tions. Researchers define connections in different ways. A strand of the literature
studies campaign contributions. Connections established through campaign contri-
butions have distinctive features. They are built through a cash donation and the
expectation that the relationship will continue in the future. Because it involves a
cash disbursement, researchers also investigate whether it is an investment in po-
litical capital or a reflection of agency problems.14 Finally, donations are regulated
and there is an ongoing debate about the optimal design of such laws. This paper
is closely related to Baltrunaite (2018), who explores a ban on corporate donations
in Lithuania. She finds that donors’ probability of winning contracts decreases by
5%. The effects do not come from sole-bid tenders; they are driven by auctions with
multiple tenders. The results suggest that quid pro quo is present even in competi-
tive auctions. She proposes two explanations: governments inhibit participation in
auctions by imposing restrictions that drive away competitors, or there is leakage
of information about competitors’ bids. I propose an alternative explanation: pref-
erential treatment in payment periods. I also highlight the necessity of employing
within-firm estimations when trying to assess the impact of this type of reform.
Another strand of the literature defines connections using different measures:
CEOs and politicians have educational, professional or social ties, a large share-
holder or officer is a member of the parliament or the executive, a former politician
sits on the board of directors, among others. Researchers have uncovered multiple
channels through which politicians can benefit connected firms. For instance, polit-
ically connected firms have more access to finance, win more government contracts,
are more likely to be bailed out or to receive government funds, and are more able to
circumvent regulations.15 These benefits are usually associated with an increase in
13This reasoning implicitly assumes that it is costly for the politician to form a new relationship
with another firm.
14 The evidence about whether donations are value-enhancing is mixed. See Aggarwal, Meschke,
and Wang (2012), Akey (2015), Cooper, Gulen and Ovtchinnikov (2010), and Fowler, Garro, and
Spenkuch (2017).
15See Khwaja and Mian (2005), Brogaard, Denes and Duchin (2016), Li, Wang and Zhou (2008),
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firm value and performance.16 In the context of Brazil, Claessens, Feijen and Laeven
(2008) show that campaign contributions are associated with more bank financing,
and Arvate, Barbosa and Fuzitani (2018) show that campaign contributions are
linked to more government contracts.
1.2 Empirical setting
1.2.1 Budget execution
Three laws govern the budget process in Brazil: the Multi-Year Plan (Plano
Pluri-Anual), the Budget Guidance Law (Lei de Diretrizes Orçamentárias) and the
Annual Budget Law (Lei Orçamentária Anual). The executive branch proposes the
laws, and the local legislature amends and approves them. While the Multi-Year
Plan (Plano Pluri-Anual) covers a period of four years, the other two cover a period
of one year. The Multi-Year Plan specifies long-term goals and investments, and
projects that will be included in multiple annual budgets. It must be approved in
the first year of the mayor’s term. The Budget Guidance Law contains the rules that
guide the elaboration and execution of the annual budget. It specifies programs that
should be prioritized, rules to make budgetary adjustments if realized revenues are
smaller than expected, and fiscal targets, including a target for the primary surplus.
Once the legislature approves the Budget Guidance Law, the elaboration of the
Annual Budget Law commences. The budget details the allocation of predicted
revenues to each government agency and program. The budget is comprehensive,
that is, an agency can only execute an expense if it is prescribed in the budget.
However, the government does not have to execute every expense that is included in
the budget. The expenses that have to be executed are called mandatory expenses,
while the expenses that might not be executed are called discretionary expenses.
When revenues turn out to be smaller than the predicted values used to elaborate
Schoenher (2018), Goldman, Rocholl and So (2013), Faccio, Masulis and McConnell (2006), and
Fisman and Wang (2015).
16 See Cingano and Pinotti (2013), Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak and Mitton (2017),
Amore and Bennedsen (2013), Bunkanwanicha and Wiwattanakantang (2009), Fisman (2011),
Faccio (2006), Ferguson and Voth (2008), Duchin and Sosyura (2012), Jayachandran (2006), and
Goldman, Rocholl and So (2009), and Tahoun (2014).
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the budget, the treasury secretary must limit the execution of discretionary expenses
in order to meet fiscal targets.
When the fiscal year starts, the executive branch begins to execute the budget.
The budget execution process can be roughly divided into four stages (see Figure
1.1):
• Authorization: agencies are authorized to commit resources according to the
appropriations defined in the budget and realized revenues.
• Commitment: agencies reserve part of their appropriation to purchase the
good or service from a previously selected supplier. The amount committed is
deducted from the budget allocation.
• Verification: government formally acknowledges that the good or service was
delivered according to specifications.
• Payment: cash is transferred to the supplier.
The length of time between the verification stage and the payment stage is a
proxy for the effective maturity of the trade credit that suppliers extend to the gov-
ernment. Physical delivery can precede the verification date, especially for products
whose verification is more complex and services that do not have a clear delivery
date, such as construction.17 I restrict the analysis to three classes of products to
minimize measurement error.
I classify commitments into two types: ordinary and non-ordinary. The commit-
ment is ordinary when there is only one verification and only one payment. This
type of commitment is common in expenses whose value is certain. In this case, the
commitment date can be a good proxy for the date of the order. A non-ordinary
commitment can be followed by multiple stages of verification and payments. In
this case, orders might occur after the commitment date. This type of commitment
is employed in expenses whose value cannot be predetermined (for example energy
bills, fuel) and in expenses whose value can be predetermined but that occur in
instalments (for example, rent).
17There is an intermediate stage between the commitment and the verification stages that is
known as “in verification”. The date of this stage would be the actual delivery date.
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1.2.2 Public procurement
Government agencies can employ different methods to procure goods and ser-
vices.18 In certain cases the government can directly contract with a supplier, that
is, tenders can be waived. This happens mainly in two cases: when competition is
unfeasible (there is only one supplier) or when the purchase is small.19 The regula-
tion establishes a threshold to define small. For products and services, the threshold
is BRL 8,000, while for construction it is BRL 15,000.20 I classify the cases without
a tendering process as non-competitive procurement.
The other methods involve a tendering process. Invitation to tender and reverse
auctions (regular and electronic) are examples. The method itself depends on the
scope and value of the purchase (see figure 1.9 in the appendix for details). Even
though these methods can differ in important dimensions, for instance conditions to
participate, I classify them in a single group as competitive procurement. The use of
electronic reverse auctions has increased over time, especially for simple products.21
Government agencies have to pay suppliers within 30 days following the acknowl-
edgement that the object of the contract was delivered. When the purchase is small
(same thresholds as for direct contracting), the limit is reduced to 5 days. Payments
outside the limits are common. In such cases, the amount due can be adjusted by
inflation and a late payment interest rate. However, these adjustments are rare and
do not fully compensate firms for their losses and increased liquidity risk. Facing
delays, suppliers can take the local government to court. However, in addition to
having a cost, this procedure is unlikely to be effective. Courts are congested in
Brazil and time in court can be long. Suppliers can also decide to terminate the
contract, but this decision is only feasible if payment delays are longer than 90 days.
The government is only considered to be in default in this case. Delays smaller than
90 days are not considered a contract breach.
18Law 8.666 - the Public Procurement Law - contains most of the public procurement regulation.
19The regulation considers other cases, but they are less common. For instance, emergency
situations and threats to national security.
20In 2018, the limits changed. Decree 9.412, 18/06/2018.
21Since 2005, the use of electronic reverse auctions to procure standard goods is mandatory for
the federal government. Decree 5.450, 31/05/2005.
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1.2.3 Municipal elections and electoral reforms
Municipal elections are held every four years in Brazil (see Figure 1.2 for a
description of the electoral calendar). They are held simultaneously, usually in
October, to elect the mayor and city councillors, who will serve a four-year term.
Contenders that are elected take office on the 1st of January of the coming year.
Mayors can run for re-election. However, after the second consecutive term in office,
they are not allowed to run again. If they want an additional term, they have to
wait until the next election. Members of the local council do not face a limit and
can be re-elected indefinitely. The council is elected in an open-list proportional
representation system.22 Mayors are elected by absolute majority. In municipalities
where the number of voters is bigger than 200,000, there is a run-off if no candidate
obtains more than 50% + 1 of the votes in the first round. Because of the large
number of parties in Brazil, it is common for parties to form a coalition in elections.
Among other benefits, coalitions increase the airtime of TV and radio ads, as they
are free in Brazil and proportional to the number of seats that the parties of the
coalition have in the federal congress.
Until 2015, campaigns were financed through private donations and public funds.
Individuals and firms could donate to political parties or candidates. Firms could
donate up to 2% of their total sales, while individuals could donate up to 10% of
their annual income. If the individual is a candidate, there is no limit: they can
donate as much as they want to their own campaign.
Since 2013, a large anti-corruption investigation revealed a widespread kickback
scheme that involved the funding of parties with money obtained from government
contracts. Several members of the business and political elite were convicted of cor-
ruption charges. Reacting to a growing unrest, institutions – the judiciary and the
federal legislature – started to consider measures to deter corruption. In 2013, the
Supreme Court began to discuss whether the rules that allowed campaign contribu-
tions were unconstitutional. The case was brought by the Brazilian Bar Association.
In September 2015, with 8 votes in favour and 3 against, the Supreme Court de-
22Parties form local coalitions. The number of seats that are allocated to a coalition is calculated
as a proportion to the total number of votes that it receives. If there are n seats available and the
total number of votes is v, the coalition that receives vc votes fills roughly vc × n/v seats. Within
each coalition, the candidates that receive more votes win the seats.
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clared corporate donations unconstitutional. The result was not unexpected: in the
beginning of 2014 it was clear that the majority of judges would vote against corpo-
rate donations. However, it was not clear when they would finish the trial and, until
then, judges could change their votes. Moreover, it was not clear in which elections
the new rules would be put into effect. It is not uncommon for the Supreme Court
to postpone the implementation of a new rule to allow agents to adapt.
Also in September 2015, the federal congress passed a law that changed political
campaigns considerably.23 Firstly, it established campaign limits. The limits were
set at 70% of the maximum amount spent by a candidate in the previous campaign
and then adjusted for the accumulated inflation between the last election and the
coming election. However, the limit cannot be smaller than BRL 100,000, implying
that it is only binding in larger municipalities where campaign costs are higher.
Secondly, the law introduced changes to reduce campaign costs. For instance, it
cut by half the duration of the campaigns, from 90 to 45 days. The rules regarding
the donations of individuals (whether they are candidates or not) were not changed.
Figure 1.3 summarizes the electoral changes.
1.2.4 Data and construction of variables
The State of São Paulo Court of Accounts (TCE-SP) provides data on the budget
execution of the municipalities of the state of São Paulo, excluding the capital (644
municipalities). The TCE-SP provides detailed information on the stages (commit-
ment, verification and payment) of the budget execution. Crucially, it provides the
dates and monetary amounts of every commitment, verification and payment, and
the identifier of the supplier. The data also contains the procurement method that
the government employs to select the supplier and the budgetary classification of
the expense. I select three types of expenses for which the verification date is a good
proxy for the delivery date: consumption material, material for free distribution and
equipment and permanent material. I construct two measures: time between com-
mitment and verification and time between verification and payment. The latter
quantity is what I call payment period. Measurement is straightforward for ordi-
23Law 13.165, 29/09/2015.
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nary commitments. For non-ordinary commitments, I weight each operation by its
monetary value (see Figure 1.4 for an illustration). The data contains accounting
information that feeds fiscal and accounting reports. It lacks information on prices
and quantities. It also lacks details of the tendering process (participants, bids,
etc.).
The Superior Electoral Court (TSE) provides data on political campaign con-
tributions and electoral results. I collect information for the 2004, 2008, 2012 and
2016 elections. For each firm, it is possible to observe to which party or candidate
it donates and in which municipality.
On a yearly basis, the Ministry of Finance provides aggregate data on the fi-
nancial situation of the municipalities, including balance sheet, revenue and expen-
diture.24 I construct two measures to assess the liquidity and degree of budgetary
rigidity of the municipalities (I provide more details on the construction of the vari-
ables in Appendix A.1). The liquidity measure is defined as the difference between
cash and equivalents and a measure of accounts payable, divided by revenues. The
higher this measure, the more liquid the municipality. The other measure is defined
as wage bill divided by revenues. Because it is virtually impossible to fire civil ser-
vants (with the exception of misconduct) and wage cuts are not allowed, the higher
this measure, the higher the proportion of the budget that cannot be adjusted in
case of shocks to the revenue.
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) provides municipal-
ity characteristics, such as geographical area, GDP, literacy rate and population.
The Ministry of Labor provides data on the number of employees at the establish-
ment level.
1.2.5 Empirical strategy
I first divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the
electoral changes, and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality level25:
24Balance sheet information as of December 31. The fiscal year runs from January 1 to December
31.
25I collapse the data using the monetary value of the operations as weights. I exclude observations
whose commitment date is in August or September, because for most of them, payment takes place
close to or after the reform.
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2012 elections
donations are allowed
01/08/2014 30/07/2015
01/10/2015 30/09/2016
reforms
2016 elections
donations are not allowed
Before
After
I implement the following regression specification
∆yfm = α + β1fm + αf + αm + fm (1.1)
where 1fm is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if firm f is connected in munici-
pality m, that is, if it donates to any party of the coalition government in the 2012
elections.26 The variable ∆yfm measures changes in three variables: time between
commitment and verification, time between verification and payment, and amount
purchased. Because the same firm can have contracts in more than one municipal-
ity, I can control for time-varying changes in firm’s characteristics by including firm
fixed effects. This is a key advantage of the setting. Because electoral reforms of
this type are endogenous, they can coincide with changes in other variables that
impact firms that have relationship with politicians. As a result, donors can follow
different trends than non-donors after the reforms for reasons that are not directly
related to the electoral changes. By including firm fixed effects, I am able to control
for these changes at the firm level, and pin down the effects of the electoral changes.
I also control for time-varying municipality changes by including municipality fixed
effects.
I analyze the data at the firm-municipality level to increase the sample size, as I
need to observe contracts of the same firm in a given municipality before and after
the reforms. However, this approach does not take into account that firms could
select themselves into different procurement methods after the reform. Moreover, it
is not possible to study the heterogeneity of the effect across procurement methods.
Therefore, in a second specification I collapse the data at the firm-municipality-
procurement method level and estimate the following specification
26I also report results for a stronger form of connection: donation to incumbent’s party in the
previous election.
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∆yfmj = α + β1fm + αf + αm + fmj (1.2)
where j denotes procurement method. In this approach, I implicitly control for
procurement method fixed effects (not time-varying).
To check whether results are driven by the political cycle, I run a baseline re-
gression around the same period in the previous mayoral term (four years before).
2008 elections
donations are allowed
01/08/2010 30/07/2011
01/10/2011 30/09/2012
no
reforms
2012 elections
donations are allowed
Before
After
In the baseline regressions, a firm f is connected in municipality m if it donates
to any party of the coalition government in the 2008 elections. The crucial difference
is that firms can donate in the coming elections; there is no law that partially breaks
down the relationship between donors and politicians.
1.3 Descriptive statistics
First I collapse the data at the municipality-year level using as weights the
amount committed.27 Table 1.1 presents means, standard deviations and medians
of the main variables, across municipalities, from 2008 to 2017. From 2008 to 2014,
the mean of time between verification and payment oscillates between 16.8 and 20.3
days. In the end of 2014, the the country entered in a recession that lasted until
2016. With the economic downturn, time between verification and payment jumps
to 24.8 days in 2015, and it reaches 27.1 days in 2016.28 The recession has a large
27If, in a given year, a municipality m has Nm commitments indexed by c = 1, ..., Nm with
amount committed and time between verification and payment (or time between commitment
and verification) given by Cc and tc, respectively, then time between verification and payment of
municipality m, tm, is given by
tm =
∑Nm
c=1 Cm × tm∑Nm
c=1 Cm
28It is hard to obtain this information for other countries. Survey information, collected by
Intrum Justitia for more than 10,000 firms across Europe, shows that payment periods in govern-
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impact on the liquidity of the municipalities. The mean of the liquidity measure
drops from 13% in 2008 to 3% in 2016. The budgetary rigidity measure constantly
increases throughout the sample period. However, the impact of the recession on
this measure is small. In Figure 1.5, I split the sample into two using the median
of the liquidity measure. Municipalities with more liquidity pay between 4 and 6
days earlier. In 2015 and 2016, the difference increases to almost 8 days. The same
procedure applied to the budgetary rigidity measure shows that it also correlates
(negatively) with speed of payment. However, the magnitude of the difference is
smaller (maximum of 2 days). In Table 1.12 of the appendix, I show that liquid-
ity and rigidity correlate with observable municipality characteristics. For example,
more liquidity is associated with larger population, larger GDP per capita and higher
literacy rate. The opposite is true for rigidity. In Figure 1.10 of the appendix, I show
that the standard deviation of time between verification and payment is higher in
municipalities with lower liquidity. Moreover, it also spikes in 2015 and 2016. The
fact that there is more dispersion in payment terms when liquidity is low suggests
that the type of favoritism studied in this paper might be more relevant in such
case. More budgetary rigidity is also associated with higher standard deviation, but
the difference is smaller.
Next, I collapse the data at the firm-municipality-year-product-procurement
method level.29 To describe the data, I classify firms into four groups. A firm is
considered connected (before) at a given municipality when it donates to any party of
the coalition government in the previous elections, or connected (after) if it donates
to any party of the coalition government in the coming election. Because the dona-
tions were banned in 2015, the classification of connection (after) is unfeasible from
2013 on (see Table 1.13 in the appendix for details). Throughout the paper, unless
explicitly stated, when I refer to a connected firm it means that it is connected (be-
ment contracts can be much larger – higher than 90 days – in countries such as Portugal, Italy
and Greece. In many other countries, the magnitudes are similar to those that I find in Brazil.
See Intrum Justitia (2017).
29If a firm f at municipality m, year y, product p, procurement method j, has Nfmypj commit-
ments indexed by c = 1, ..., Nfmypj , each with value Cfmypjc and time to pay (or time to deliver)
tfmypjc, then
tfmypj =
∑Nfmypj
c=1 Cfmypjc × tfmypjc∑Nfmypj
c=1 Cfmypjc
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fore). The connection (after) definition captures the importance of future donations
for the relationship between donors and non-donors. I divide non-connected firms
into two groups. A non-connected firm is a donor if it donates to any political party
in any of the three elections in which donations were allowed (2004, 2008 and 2012),
and a non-donor otherwise. Table 1.2 provides summary statistics across the three
groups. Donors and connected firms have larger contracts. The difference is larger
when I use the connected (after) classification. The large difference in contract size
could be explained by the fact that firms that donate are larger, more efficient or
simply share an agenda the incumbent. The allocation of contracts to firms that
have a close relationship with incumbents can also be an efficient solution to issues
like moral hazard or adverse selection. Alternatively, donors could have larger con-
tracts because they donate in the previous election and commit to donating in the
next election. The time between commitment and verification is larger for donors
and connected firms. The larger size of the contracts could explain this difference
if we interpret this measure as the time between order and delivery. Connected (be-
fore) firms are paid on average 17 days after the verification stage. This number is
slightly smaller than the average for donors (19.3 days) and for non-connected firms
(18.3 days). Connected (after) firms are paid 15.7 days after the verification.
In Table 1.3, I present descriptive statistics for competitive and non-competitive
procurement. The time between verification an payment is larger for competitive
procurement. Consistent with the legislation, which says that one of the uses of
non-competitive procurement is to purchase small amounts, the average amount
committed is much larger for competitive procurement. Finally, the time between
commitment and verification is larger for competitive procurement, possibly reflect-
ing the size of the orders. Figure 1.6 shows that the share of amount committed
through competitive procurement has increased over time. It increased from 55%
in 2008 to almost 80% in 2014. This reflects the efforts of the executive branch
and controlling agencies, such as state courts of accounts, to increase the adoption
of competitive methods, especially electronic reverse auctions, in the purchase of
off-the-shelf products.
Table 1.4 provides descriptive statistics for the decision to donate. I restrict the
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sample to firms that have contracts in 2008 and 2012 (election years). Panel A
explores firm characteristics for the firms that donate and firms that do not donate.
Firms that donate are larger in terms of number of employees and have larger con-
tracts. Panel B explores the locality of the donation. Firms have more workers and
larger contracts in the municipality where they donate. The municipalities where
they donate are more populous and have a higher GDP per capita, population den-
sity and literacy rate. However, they are similar in terms of liquidity and budgetary
rigidity. They are also similar in terms of electoral competitiveness, which I measure
by the difference in the share of votes between winner and runner-up. Panel C ex-
plores the choice of the party that receives a contribution. Incumbents and winners
receive larger donations, and the firms that donate to them have larger contracts.
The parties that receive donations obtain a higher percentage of votes.
Even though the sample has a large number of observations, the number of ob-
servations from firms classified as connected is small. Table 1.14 in the appendix
presents the number of connected observations. Since I use firm-time fixed effects, I
also report the number of firms that have contracts in more than one municipality.
The small number of connected firms that have contracts in other municipalities lim-
its the use of some empirical strategies, for instance the restriction of the sample to
municipalities with close elections. In Table 1.15, I split the number of observations
marked as connected into two groups: competitive and non-competitive procure-
ment. In general, competitive procurement represents less than 25% of the number
of observations. However, despite the smaller number, they account for the majority
of the amount committed and the share increases over time, reaching more than 80%
in 2016.
1.3.1 Time series variation of partial correlations
In an attempt to understand the impact of connections throughout the political
cycles and before and after the reforms, I run the following cross-sectional regressions
(per year):
yfmpj = α + β1fm + controls+ fmpj (1.3)
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where 1fm is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm f is connected in
municipality m, that is, if it donates to any party of the coalition government in
the previous elections when current incumbents were elected. The subscripts p and
j denote product and procurement method, respectively. Because connections are
formed endogenously, we cannot interpret the magnitude and sign of the coefficients:
they should be interpreted as partial correlations. The idea is to study the evolution
of the correlations over time.
Table 1.5 provides the time-series variation of β’s. Without controls, the correla-
tion between time between verification and payment and connection is negative and,
in most years, statistically significant. I then include firm fixed effects to control
for unobservable firm characteristics, such as the ability to produce goods and to
collect payments from clients. I also include municipality fixed effects to control for
omitted variables such as the ability of the municipality to pay on time. When I add
these fixed effects, the magnitude decreases and in most years there is no statistical
significance. The exception is the year 2016, when coefficients are larger (4.4 days)
and statistically significant. Because the electoral changes take place at the end of
2015, this is suggestive evidence that they could be one of the reasons behind this
change. The year 2016 is the final year of the mayor’s term and also an election
year. I do not observe the same effect in years that share those characteristics, 2008
and 2012. The inclusion of product and procurement method fixed effects does not
change the results. In one specification, I include firm-party fixed effects to com-
pare the same firm in municipalities governed by the same party. This inclusion
controls for a common agenda between incumbents and donors. Despite the loss of
power, the pattern remains the same: in 2016 the coefficient becomes positive and
statistically significant.
I also report results for amount purchased. Without controls, the correlation
between amount contracted and connection is positive and statistically significant.
Once I include firm and municipality fixed effects, the magnitudes decrease but
remain statistically significant in most years. From 2014 on, magnitudes start to
decrease and lose statistical significance.
Table 1.16 in the appendix reports results for time between commitment and
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verification. Without controls, coefficients are in general positive and statistically
significant, possibly reflecting the larger size of the orders. However, once fixed
effects are included, coefficients are not statistically significant and there is no clear
change in 2016. Table 1.17 reports results for the connection (after) measure until
2012. The magnitudes of the correlation are larger for this measure.
1.3.2 Parallel trends
Before preceding to the main results, I estimate the following panel regression:
ytfmpj =
2017∑
t=2009
βt1fmt × 1t + αft + αmt + αfm + αp + αj + tfmpj
where 2008 is the baseline year (the category excluded from the interaction 1fmt×1t),
ytfmpj denotes time between verification and payment of firm f , in municipality m,
through procurement method j, in year t, of product p. The variable 1fmt takes
value 1 if firm f is connected in municipality m in year t, and zero otherwise. The
variable 1t takes value 1 when the year is t. A firm is classified as connected if
it donates to any party of the coalition government in the previous elections. αft
denotes firm-year, αmt municipality-year, αfm firm-municipality, αp product, and αj
procurement method fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-year
and municipality-year levels.
Figure 1.7 shows the results. From 2009 to 2015, the year of the reforms, the β’s
are small in magnitude and statistically indistinguishable from zero. This pattern
changes in 2016, when the reform took effect: the magnitude of the coefficient
increases to 4 days and becomes statistically significant.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Time between verification and payment
Table 1.6 reports the coefficients of Equation 1 with the firm-municipality aggre-
gation. Connected firms are paid 5 days later once I include firm and municipality
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fixed effects.30 Effects increase to 11.7 days when I restrict the sample to munici-
palities with low liquidity, where low is defined as below the 2015 median. In this
specification, I compare the same firm, before and after the reforms, in municipalities
with low liquidity where it is connected versus in municipalities with low liquidity
where it is not connected. The reason for this cut is that arguably payment periods
are an important dimension when municipalities experience a cash shortage. In such
cases, governments have to choose which firms are paid in accordance with the trade
credit terms or which firms face smaller delays. If liquidity shocks to the municipal-
ity coincide with liquidity shocks to the firm, this type of favoritism is even more
relevant as it takes place when the marginal value of cash is high. The favor, in this
case, would have an insurance characteristic. Stretched payment periods would be
less of a problem if governments have enough cash to pay every supplier on time.
Indeed, for municipalities with high liquidity, effects are not statistically significant.
However, because liquidity is an endogenous variable that correlates with observ-
able and unobservable characteristics that could also affect favoritism, we cannot
conclude that it is the only driver of the results.
Table 1.6 also provides the estimates for the baseline estimation. I run the same
regressions around the same point of the previous mayoral term, when electoral
rules are unchanged. Estimates are not significant, providing evidence that the
effects are not driven by characteristics of the political cycle. When I restrict the
sample to municipalities with low liquidity, where low is also defined as below the
2015 median, the effect is negative, albeit not statistically significant.31 The effect
for municipalities with high liquidity is not statistically significant and similar in
magnitude to the effects obtained around the reforms.
Next, I estimate Equation 2, in which I implicitly control for procurement method
fixed-effects. Table 1.7 provides the results. In the specification with firm and
30The estimates without firm fixed effects are smaller. One possible reason is that reforms
coincide with a smaller provision of bank or trade credit to campaign donors. This reduction
increases the marginal value of cash for these firms and thus they make large efforts to collect
payments from clients. A regression that does not account for this time-varying effort underestimate
the results.
31I still use the 2015 median in the baseline regressions because in 2011 the country was in
a different point of the business cycle. GDP growth was 7.5% in 2010 an 4% in 2011, while it
was 0.5% in 2014 and -3.6% in 2015. Therefore, the median of the liquidity measure in 2011 is
considerably higher than the median of 2015. If I use the 2011 median as a cutoff, I could classify
as illiquid a municipality that in fact has high liquidity.
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municipality fixed effects, estimates are smaller, 3.4 days and only significant at the
10% level. Effects are larger when I only consider competitive procurement, 11.4
days. In this specification, I compare the payment patterns of contracts awarded in
competitive auctions by the same firm, before and after the reforms, in municipalities
where it is connected versus in municipalities where it is not connected. In the
baseline estimations, effects are negative and not statistically significant. For non-
competitive procurement, effects estimated around the reform and in the previous
mayoral term are not statistically significant and similar in magnitude. The results
suggest that speed of payment is an important way of distorting public procurement
when it is more difficult to simply award contracts to connected firms.
Tables 1.18 and 1.19 in the appendix provide the estimates of equations 1 and
2 for a stricter measure of connection. I define a firm as connected in a given
municipality if it donates to the incumbent’s party in the previous election. Results
are similar and estimates are in general slightly larger. For instance, the main effect
increases from 5 to 5.9 days. Only for competitive procurement the magnitude of
the effect decreases to 7.7 days. However, it remains statistically significant at the
1% level.
Breza and Liberman (2017) show that buyers use trade credit to assess the quality
of the products.32 Therefore, there is a concern that the effect is driven by the fact
that, after the breakdown of the relationship, governments have to spend more time
assessing the quality of products delivered by connected firms. If this is the case, the
effect is driven by the fact that there is more uncertainty about product quality, and
not because donors no longer receive favors in terms of payment terms. However,
this is not a major concern in this setting because I measure payment period as the
time between verification and payment. In the verification stage, the government
acknowledges that the object of the contract was delivered accordingly. I return to
this point when I discuss time between commitment and verification.
32The idea that delayed payments can be used to mitigate concerns about product quality dates
back to Smith (1987), Lee and Stowe (1993) and Long, Malitz and Ravid (1993).
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1.4.2 Other outcome variables
For non-competitive procurement methods, the allocation of a contract is ar-
guably the first-order channel through which politicians can favor connected firms.
The breakdown of the relationship between donors and politicians would be followed
by a smaller amount committed. In competitive procurement, the government’s
commitment to pay earlier enables connected firms to outbid non-connected firms
that are otherwise similar. Therefore, amount committed and payment periods are
jointly determined and an increase in payment periods would also be followed by a
decrease in amount committed. I estimate Equations 1 and 2 for changes in log of
amount committed. The estimation of the effected for amount committed is hin-
dered by the fact this variable is stickier than the payment period variable. The
length of the contracts can be as large as one year, especially for large amounts,
and commitments after the reform could refer to contracts awarded before the re-
form. Tables 1.8 and 1.9 present the results. In general, estimates are negative –
decrease in growth of amount committed – but not statistically significant. For the
regressions that use the entire sample, the estimates are larger (in absolute values)
than the baseline estimates. Consistent with the idea that the amount committed
is the relevant channel in non-competitive procurement, around the reform the esti-
mate is negative, -18%, while the baseline estimate is positive, 12%. Effects are not
statistically significant though. For competitive procurement the decrease around
the reform is smaller in magnitude than the baseline estimates. This result is in
contrast to the idea that larger payment periods result in fewer contracts. However,
to test this hypothesis properly, I would have to look at changes in the probabilities
of winning new contracts.
Even though I restrict the sample to simple products that have a clear delivery
date and are easy to verify, there is still the possibility that connected firms are
benefited through a more timely verification. Alternatively, because of the contin-
uing nature of the relationship between donors and politicians, issues like adverse
selection are not present, and governments can spend less time assessing the quality
of the products delivered by connected firms. I test this hypothesis using time be-
tween commitment and verification as an outcome variable. The results should be
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interpreted with caution because the reforms can affect characteristics of the orders
that impact the outcome variable. For example, an increase in time between com-
mitment and verification for connected firms can be offset by the fact that orders
are smaller (and thus the supplier can deliver more quickly) after the reform. Tables
1.10 and 1.11 show that estimates are slightly larger around the reform in compar-
ison to baseline estimates. However, in both cases estimates are not statistically
significant.
1.4.3 Discussion
What is the economic significance of the results? The largest estimate is 12
days. Barrot and Nanda (2018) find that a 15-day reduction in payment periods
causes an increase of 1.7% in employment. In Brazil, because financial frictions are
higher, effects could be larger. However, in monetary amounts, effects are not large.
I compute the monetary benefit to connected firms using the interest rate on loans
that have trade bills as collateral.33 Figure 1.8 plots the time series of the average
interest rates on these loans. Throughout the sample period, the average annual
interest rate is 33.5%, the maximum is 44.9%, and the minimum is 21.4% . The
total amount committed to connected firms in 2014, before the electoral reforms, is
BRL 103 million (in 2017 BRL). It represents 1.68% of the total amount committed
on the three classes of products of the sample, BRL 6,132 million. Using the estimate
of the effect from Equation 1, 5 days, and the minimum and maximum interest rates,
the monetary benefit for connected firms ranges from BRL 0.32 million to BRL 0.63
million.34 As a percentage of the amount committed to connected firms, it ranges
from 0.31% to 0.61%. In terms of the total amount committed, the effects range
from 0.005% to 0.01%. In comparison to the amount that connected firms donate,
effects are also small. Connected firms donate BRL 7.75 million to parties of the
coalition governments in the 2012 elections. If we include the donations to parties
that are not part of the coalition, the amount is BRL 10.63 million. Even the largest
(annual) estimate, BRL 0.63 million, received over the entire mayoral term, 4 years,
33For a firm that has excess cash and does not need to borrow to finance its production process,
the opportunity cost of capital would be the short-term rate that they obtain on their investments.
34I perform the calculations with 4 working days.
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would be smaller than the amount that firms donate.
The benefits do not seem to be large. However, because firm owners can still
donate as a natural person (or even illegally), the breakdown of the relationship is
only partial. It is difficult to assess to which extent the relationship was broken,
but we can interpret the magnitudes as a lower bound of the effect in the case
of a complete breakdown. I also show cases in which the effects are more relevant,
competitive procurement and illiquid municipalities. Moreover, in this paper, I focus
on simple products. Possibly because it is more difficult to distort procurement of
these goods, few firms actually donate. Only 21% of the donations in the 2012
elections come from firms that are in the sample and have contracts over the entire
mayoral term (from 2013 to 2016). The large donations come from firms from other
sectors, mainly construction. A possible reason is that it is easier to rig auctions
for construction services. The selection of the supplier is not only based on price in
these cases, but also on technical capability. However, favoritism through payment
periods could still be important. The reason is as follows: because it is more difficult
to verify the object of the contract and there is no clear delivery date, there is one
extra dimension to favour firms though payment period: the verification stage. By
postponing the certification that the object of the contract was executed according
to specifications, agencies can delay payment. The discretion over the verification
and payment stages enables a larger benefit through payment terms. The same
argument is valid for services.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that payment periods to campaign donors change
after an electoral reform that bans corporate political contributions. The firms that
donate in the previous elections can no longer commit to donating in the coming elec-
tions, partially breaking down the relationship between them and politicians. The
changes are more pronounced in municipalities with lower liquidity and in contracts
awarded through competitive procurement methods. The results draw attention to
a new channel through which politicians can distort public procurement even when
the use of competitive auctions is mandatory. Preferential treatment in terms of
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payment speed might affect the ability of non-connected firms to win contracts,
especially if these firms are financially constrained. The findings help to explain
the fact that donors are more likely to win competitive auctions.35 The paper also
sheds light on the informal relational contract between politicians and donors. In
particular, it highlights the fact that the prospect of receiving future donations is a
key incentive for politicians to grant favors. From a policy perspective, the results
call for rules that curb discretion over payment periods and properly compensate
firms for late payments.
The results also stress the importance of using within-firm estimates to assess
the impacts of electoral reforms. This type of reform is particularly endogenous
and likely correlates with changes in other variables that affect firms that have
close relationships with politicians. As a result, the trajectory of non-donors is
not a good counterfactual for the trajectory of donors. A difference-in-differences
estimation that does not account for time-varying shocks at the firm level would
provide biased results. I explore the fact that the same firm has relationships of
different intensity with local politicians across municipalities. Therefore, the reforms
affect the relationship in some municipalities but not in others. This heterogeneity
allows me to include firm-time fixed effects and provide more credible estimates. This
inclusion guarantees that the results are driven by the shock to the relationship with
politicians and not by changes in other variables that coincide with the reforms and
affect differently donors versus non-donors.
The paper also contributes to the understanding of determinants of actual pay-
ment periods in trade credit contracts and how the nature of the relationship be-
tween transaction parts can affect them. The literature on trade credit usually
studies trade credit terms, which differ from the effective time to pay. I study this
measure in the context of contracts between firms and the government and show
that campaign contributions (or connections more broadly) are an important deter-
minant of this variable. Studies of the same measure in contracts between private
35In this paper I focus on one type of preferential treatment after the bidding stage that increases
the competitiveness of donors. However, there are other possible explanations. Politicians can
commit to smaller execution costs (less paperwork, etc.). In cases in which there is uncertainty
about execution costs, as in infrastructure projects, renegotiations are common and politicians can
commit to renegotiating at better terms.
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firms could shed light on important elements of their relationship.
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1.6 Figures
Figure 1.1: Budget execution
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Figure 1.3: Electoral reform
Before After
Campaign duration 90 days 45 days
First round: up to 70% of the mostly expensive
campaign in the previous election, in the
the case of a one-round previous election; or
Campaign spending No limit 50% in the case of a two-round previous election
limits - Mayor Second round: 30% of the most expensive
campaign in the previous election.
The limit cannot be smaller than R$ 100,000.
Campaign spending Up to 70% of the mostly expensive
limits - members No limit campaign in the previous election
of local parliaments The limit cannot be smaller than R$ 10,000.
Donation - legal Firms could donate up to 2% Unlawful
person of their total sales.
Donation - natural Individuals could donate up to Unchanged
person 10% of their annual income.
Donation - No limit, as long as the total campaign Unchanged
candidates cost comply with the limits.
Figure 1.4: Ordinary and non-ordinary commitment
tc tv tp
$ C $ V $ P
Ordinary commitment
C=V=P
Time to deliver= tv-tc
Time to pay= tp-tv
tc tv1 tp1 tv2 tp2
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Non-ordinary commitment
C=V1 + V2=P1 + P2
Time to deliver=
= tv1×V1+tv2×V2−tc×C
C
Time to pay=
= tp1×P1+tp2×P2−tv1×V1−tv2×V2
C
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Figure 1.5: Mean of time between verification and payment: relationship
with (lagged) fiscal variables
Notes: The data is aggregated at the municipality level using monetary values as weights. For each year, I split the
sample into two groups using the medians of the liquidity measure. I repeat the procedure for the budgetary rigidity
measure. I then compute the mean of time between verification and payment for each group. I compute liquidity
as follows: (cash - accounts payable) / revenues. The budgetary rigidly measure is defined as wage bill / revenues.
The construction of both measures is explained in detail in the appendix A.1.In 2013 there is a reclassification of
accounting variables, which might affect the values of fiscal variables.
Figure 1.6: Share of amount committed through competitive procurement
Notes: A procurement method is non-competitive if there is no tendering process (direct contracting). Otherwise,
if there is any sort of tendering process, the procurement method is classified as competitive.
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Figure 1.7: Parallel trends, time between verification and payment
Notes: The figure plots the βi’s and the respective 5% confidence intervals estimated from the following regression:
ytfmpj =
∑2017
i=2009 βi1fmt + αft + αmt + αfm + αp + αj + tfmpj . The sample starts in 2008, which is the
baseline year in the regression. ytfmpj denotes time between verification and payment of firm f , in municipality
m, through procurement method j, in year t, of product p. The variable 1fmt takes value 1 if firm f is connected
in municipality m in year t, and zero otherwise. A firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of the
coalition government in the previous elections. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-time and municipality-time
levels.
Figure 1.8: Interest rates: Brazil and US
Notes: Annual (nominal) Central Bank interest rates. It also presents the average interest rate of new operations
that involve the discount of trade bills. The Brazilian Central bank describes theses operations as the “advance
of funds to non-financial corporations based on future cash flows linked to trade bills or other receivables, except
checks and credit card bills”. The average is weighted by the value of the operations.
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1.7 Tables
Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics - municipality variation
Time between Time between
commitment and verification
Commitment GDP verification and payment
year growth mean sd med. mean sd med.
2008 5.1% 37.2 19.0 37.9 16.8 9.2 15.6
2009 -0.1% 35.5 17.8 36.2 16.9 9.6 15.8
2010 7.5% 38.1 18.9 38.5 18.5 10.4 17.0
2011 4.0% 37.1 19.6 37.2 17.8 9.4 16.6
2012 1.9% 38.1 20.5 39.0 20.3 11.1 19.3
2013 3.0% 35.6 18.8 36.5 17.0 8.3 16.3
2014 0.5% 38.5 20.0 37.9 18.7 10.0 17.7
2015 -3.6% 33.5 19.2 31.9 24.8 12.1 23.6
2016 -3.5% 33.5 18.3 32.6 27.1 13.3 25.5
2017 1.0% 31.7 17.5 29.5 21.77 9.72 20.81
Liquidity Budgetary
Commitment Federal primary rigidity
year surplus (%GDP) mean sd med. mean sd med.
2008 2.3% 0.13 0.18 0.08 0.44 0.06 0.44
2009 1.2% 0.12 0.19 0.09 0.46 0.08 0.46
2010 2.0% 0.14 0.20 0.08 0.45 0.07 0.46
2011 2.1% 0.13 0.19 0.08 0.46 0.07 0.46
2012 1.8% 0.10 0.20 0.05 0.48 0.07 0.48
2013 1.4% 0.10 0.18 0.06 0.48 0.07 0.49
2014 -0.4% 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.48 0.08 0.49
2015 -2.0% 0.05 0.17 0.03 0.49 0.07 0.49
2016 -2.6% 0.03 0.15 0.03 0.49 0.07 0.49
2017 -1.9% 0.06 0.17 0.04 0.50 0.07 0.50
Notes: The data is aggregated at the municipality level using monetary values as weights. I compute means,
standard deviations and medians across municipalities. I calculate liquidity as follows: (cash - accounts payable)
/ revenues. The budgetary rigidly measure is defined as wage bill / revenues. The construction of both measures
is explained in detail in the appendix A.1. In 2013 there is a reclassification of accounting variables, which might
affect the values of fiscal variables.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics
Connected (before) Connected (after)
Non-connected Non-connected
Non-donor Donor Connected Non-donor Donor Connected
Time between mean 18.3 19.3 17.0 17.4 18.6 15.7
verification and sd 18.3 18.8 18.3 17.4 18.2 15.7
payment p75 26.1 27.3 24.0 25.5 27.0 22.1
p50 14.0 15.0 11.7 13.4 14.7 11.5
p25 5.8 6.0 4.7 5.0 5.8 5.0
Time between mean 22.8 24.8 25.1 22.5 25.5 26.1
commitment sd 26.5 28.4 28.6 26.4 29.1 28.6
and verification p75 31.0 34.0 33.1 30.8 35.0 34.8
p50 14.7 16.0 16.0 14.3 16.8 17.6
p25 4.3 5.0 6.0 4.1 5.0 7.0
Amount mean 17316 43036 46503 17150 41626 59671
committed sd 135950 302369 224192 133381 268318 329909
(in 2017 BRL) p75 8042 12839 13423 8897 13904 17915
p50 2327 3633 3142 2476 4052 4345
p25 618 926 666 652 1018 866
N 2372390 250802 16834 1136944 131283 10506
Notes: The data is aggregated at the firm-municipality-product-year-procurement method level. The sample com-
prises observations from 2008 to 2017. Connected (before) means that the firm donates to any part of the coalition
government in the previous election. More specifically, a firm is connected (before) in 2008 if it donates to the
coalition government in the 2004 elections; a firm is connected (before) in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 if it donates to
the coalition government in the 2008 elections; and a firm is connected (before) in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 if it
donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections. Because donations are not allowed in the 2016 elections,
a firm is connected (before) in 2017 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections.Connected (after)
means that the firm donates to any party of the coalition government in the next election. Since the last election in
which donations were allowed occurred in 2012, the sample contains observations from 2008 to 2012. More specifi-
cally, a firm is connected (after) in 2008 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2008 elections; and a firm
is connected (after) in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections.
Monetary amounts are in 2017 values. I use the consumer price index (Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor
Amplo, IPCA) to adjust the values.
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Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics: competitive and non-competitive
procurement
Time between Amount committed Time between
Commit. verification and payment (in 2017 BRL) commitment and verification
year Non-compet. Compet. Non-compet. Compet. Non-compet. Compet.
2008 16.0 17.6 10167 67737 17.8 41.8
2009 16.6 17.8 7952 66009 17.5 41.9
2010 18.0 18.8 7381 75670 18.0 44.0
2011 17.1 18.6 7675 70538 18.5 43.2
2012 18.6 19.8 7684 71440 18.8 44.3
2013 16.7 17.0 6824 68818 18.6 41.5
2014 17.9 18.8 6214 67854 18.4 41.9
2015 19.5 23.3 5474 58455 17.4 37.8
2016 20.7 25.3 5954 56828 17.2 38.7
2017 17.5 20.9 4965 51050 16.2 35.9
Notes: The data is aggregated at the firm-municipality-product-year-procurement method level. A procurement
method is non-competitive if it does not involve any tendering process (direct contracting). Otherwise, if there is
any sort of tendering process, the procurement method is classified as competitive. Monetary amounts are in 2017
values. I use the consumer price index (Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo, IPCA) to adjust the
values.
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Table 1.4: Descriptive statistics - donations
Mean Median
Non-donor Donor P-value Non-donor Donor
Panel A: Non-donor vs donor. Population: suppliers in 2008 or 2012.
Number of workers 32.7 177.8 0 3 7
Amount committed (in 2012 BRL) 49013 270359 0 4707 11578
Observations 135259 3944
Panel B: Locality of the donation. Population: donor-municipality pairs with a contract in
in 2008 or 2012. The supplier must be a donor in at least one municipality.
Share number of workers 1.54 79.65 0 0 100
Amount committed (in 2012 BRL) 63092 109682 0 7413 8926
Population 88851 141906 0 32824 59183
Population density 420.2 683.4 0 78.1 142.6
Literacy rate 98.8 98.9 0 98.9 99.0
GDP per capita 22809 23527 0.08 18405 19238
Ratio (cash-accounts 0.13 0.13 0.42 0.09 0.08
payable)/ revenues
Ration wage bill 0.45 0.45 0.15 0.45 0.45
/ revenues
Average margin of 25.9 25.7 0.79 16.2 16.4
election winner
Observations 7816 2405
Panel C: Party selection. Population: supplier-municipality pairs with a contract in
2008 or 2012. The supplier must be a donor in the municipality of the pair.
Panel C.1: Donation to incumbent’s party?
Value donation 5786 7950 0.04 853 1746
Amount commited 66557 199554 0 7670 15338
Observations 2194 896
Panel C.2: Donation to the party of the next incumbent (winner)?
Value donation 5052 9775 0 900 1500
Amount commited 92000 137506 0.02 8384 11025
Observations 2199 891
Panel C.3: Donation to a party that has a candidate in the mayoral election?
Value donation 2272 9054 0 573 1570
Amount commited 59424 134255 0 7241 10336
Observations 1203 1887
Panel C.4: Party received donation?
Percentage of votes 31.6% 38.5% 0 32.0% 39.8%
Observations 2955 924
Notes: Panel A compares, among the suppliers in 2008 and 2012, firms that donate and firms that do not donate.
In Panel B, I restrict the sample to municipality-firm pairs in which: (i) the firm donates in at least one municipality
and (ii) the firm has contracts in the municipality. Then I compare municipality characteristics. Monetary amounts
are in 2012 values. I use the consumer price index (Índice Nacional de Preços ao Consumidor Amplo, IPCA) to
adjust the values.
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Table 1.5: Partial correlations: cross-sectional regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Commit. Elect. Time between verification Log
Year year and payment (amount committed)
2008 X 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.61*** 0.19 0.18* 0.27*
2009 -1.9*** -0.9 -0.8 -0.4 0.45*** 0.19** 0.23*** 0.21
2010 -0.9** 0.3 0.4 -1.3 0.43*** 0.04 0.11 -0.12
2011 -0.0 0.9 1.0 -1.7 0.37*** 0.14* 0.21*** 0.12
2012 X -1.8*** -0.4 -0.4 1.1 0.25*** 0.13 0.22** 0.08
2013 -1.5*** 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.28*** 0.16* 0.22** 0.38***
2014 -1.4*** 1.8* 1.8* 2.3 0.27*** 0.06 0.12 0.19
2015 -3.1*** 0.5 0.5 1.4 0.16*** 0.08 0.14* 0.16
2016 X -0.9 4.4*** 4.4*** 5.6** 0.20*** 0.06 0.08 0.11
2017 -1.0** 3.4*** 3.4*** 4.9** 0.07 -0.03 -0.00 -0.01
Firm FE X X X X
Munic. FE X X X X X X
Prod. FE X X X X
Procur. FE X X X X
Firm-party FE X X
Cluster Firm & mun X X X X X X
Notes: The data is aggregated at the firm-municipality-product-year-procurement method level. The table presents
β’s of the following regression specification (estimated per commitment year): yfmpj = α+ β1fm + controls+ fmpj .
The dummy 1fm takes the value 1 if firm f is connected at municipality m, that is, if the firm donates to the any
party of the coalition government in the previous election. More specifically, a firm is connected in 2008 if it donates
to the coalition government in the 2004 elections; a firm is connected in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 if it donates to the
coalition government in the 2008 elections; and a firm is connected in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 if it donates to the
coalition government in the 2012 elections. Because donations are not allowed in the 2016 elections, a firm is connected
in 2017 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections.
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Table 1.6: Difference-in-differences: time between verification and
payment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected 2.1** 1.6 5.0** -1.1 -1.5* 1.0
(1.0) (1.0) (2.2) (0.8) (0.8) (1.8)
Observations 81,593 81,593 53,686 81,212 81,212 52,421
R-squared 0.000 0.123 0.309 0.000 0.111 0.318
Panel B: Low liquidity
Connected 3.9** 4.0** 11.7*** -5.1*** -5.3*** -2.5
(1.7) (1.6) (4.4) (1.6) (1.7) (4.0)
Observations 39,486 39,486 22,288 24,319 24,319 11,296
R-squared 0.000 0.119 0.339 0.000 0.112 0.410
Panel C: High liquidity
Connected 0.7 -0.3 2.7 0.9 0.5 1.9
(1.2) (1.1) (1.7) (0.8) (0.7) (2.1)
Observations 38,357 38,357 21,636 56,777 56,777 34,310
R-squared 0.00 0.13 0.37 0.00 0.11 0.33
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral
changes, and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality level. In columns 4-6, I repeat the same procedure
in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take the form ∆yfm =
α + β1fm + controls + fm, where ∆yfm denotes changes in time between verification and payment of firm f in
municipality m. The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected in municipality m, and zero otherwise. In
columns 1-3, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of the coalition government in the 2012
elections. In columns 4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of the coalition government in
the 2008 elections. In panel A, I include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict the sample to municipalities whose
liquidity is below the median of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. In Panel C, I restrict the sample to
municipalities whose liquidity is above the median of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm and municipality levels.
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Table 1.7: Difference-in-differences: time between verification and
payment
(firm-municipality-procurement method regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected 1.1 0.8 3.4* -1.4** -1.7** -0.6
(0.9) (0.8) (2.1) (0.7) (0.8) (1.7)
Observations 84,586 84,586 60,379 84,955 84,955 60,301
R-squared 0.000 0.121 0.321 0.000 0.114 0.332
Panel B: Competitive
Connected 2.1 1.5 11.4*** -1.2 -1.7 -2.5
(1.8) (1.8) (3.6) (1.5) (1.7) (3.9)
Observations 23,505 23,502 18,576 18,921 18,918 14,478
R-squared 0.000 0.203 0.326 0.000 0.185 0.352
Panel C: Non-competitive
Connected 0.7 0.2 0.3 -1.4* -1.8** 0.4
(1.1) (0.9) (2.2) (0.8) (0.9) (1.8)
Observations 61,081 61,081 36,504 66,034 66,034 40,582
R-squared 0.00 0.11 0.35 0.000 0.111 0.359
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral changes,
and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality-procurement method level. In columns 4-6, I repeat the same
procedure in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take the form
∆yfmj = α+ β1fm + controls+ fmj , where ∆yfmj denotes changes in time between verification and payment of
firm f , in municipality m, through procurement method j. The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected
in municipality m, and zero otherwise. In columns 1-3, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of
the coalition government in the 2012 elections. In columns 4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any
party of the coalition government in the 2008 elections. In panel A, I include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict
the sample to competitive procurement methods. In Panel C, I restrict the sample non-competitive procurement
methods. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and municipality levels.
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Table 1.8: Difference-in-differences: amount committed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected -0.08 -0.08 -0.17 -0.13* -0.10 -0.10
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.06) (0.12)
Observations 81,593 81,593 53,686 81,212 81,212 52,421
R-squared 0.000 0.038 0.254 0.000 0.024 0.255
Panel B: Low liquidity
Connected -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.24** -0.24*** -0.41**
(0.10) (0.09) (0.21) (0.11) (0.08) (0.20)
Observations 39,486 39,486 22,288 24,319 24,319 11,296
R-squared 0.000 0.039 0.281 0.000 0.031 0.335
Panel C: High liquidity
Connected -0.10 -0.11 -0.25 -0.07 -0.03 0.03
(0.10) (0.09) (0.17) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16)
Observations 38,357 38,357 21,636 56,777 56,777 34,310
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.28 0.00 0.02 0.27
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral
changes, and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality level. In columns 4-6, I repeat the same procedure
in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take the form ∆yfm =
α+ β1fm + controls+ fm, where ∆yfm denotes changes in log of amount committed of firm f in municipality m.
The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected in municipality m, and zero otherwise. In columns 1-3, a firm
is classified as connected if it donates to any party of the coalition government in the 2012 elections. In columns
4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of the coalition government in the 2008 elections. In
panel A, I include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict the sample to municipalities whose liquidity is below
the median of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. In Panel C, I restrict the sample to municipalities whose
liquidity is above the median of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm and municipality levels.
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Table 1.9: Difference-in-differences: amount committed
(firm-municipality-procurement method regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected -0.07 -0.07 -0.14 -0.10* -0.06 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.06) (0.10)
Observations 84,586 84,586 60,379 84,955 84,955 60,301
R-squared 0.000 0.039 0.251 0.000 0.028 0.257
Panel B: Competitive
Connected -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.20
(0.12) (0.12) (0.20) (0.13) (0.12) (0.26)
Observations 23,505 23,502 18,576 18,921 18,918 14,478
R-squared 0.000 0.072 0.232 0.000 0.042 0.229
Panel C: Non-competitive
Connected -0.09 -0.09 -0.18 -0.15** -0.10 0.12
(0.07) (0.07) (0.15) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11)
Observations 61,081 61,081 36,504 66,034 66,034 40,582
R-squared 0.00 0.05 0.31 0.000 0.038 0.311
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral
changes, and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality-procurement method level. In columns 4-6, I repeat
the same procedure in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take
the form ∆yfmj = α + β1fm + controls + fmj , where ∆yfmj denotes changes in log of amount committed of
firm f , in municipality m, through procurement method j. The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected
in municipality m, and zero otherwise. In columns 1-3, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of
the coalition government in the 2012 elections. In columns 4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any
party of the coalition government in the 2008 elections. In panel A, I include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict
the sample to competitive procurement methods. In Panel C, I restrict the sample non-competitive procurement
methods. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and municipality levels.
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Table 1.10: Difference-in-differences: time between commitment and
verification
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected -2.2** -1.8 1.3 -0.2 0.2 -2.4
(1.1) (1.1) (2.2) (1.2) (1.4) (2.3)
Observations 81,593 81,593 53,686 81,212 81,212 52,421
R-squared 0.00 0.05 0.25 0.00 0.04 0.23
Panel B: Low liquidity
Connected -1.4 -1.2 4.3 1.0 1.8 2.1
(1.7) (1.5) (3.8) (2.0) (2.4) (6.8)
Observations 39,486 39,486 22,288 24,319 24,319 11,296
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.29 0.00 0.05 0.31
Panel C: High liquidity
Connected -3.1* -2.6 -2.1 -1.0 -0.7 -4.8*
(1.6) (1.6) (3.2) (1.5) (1.8) (2.9)
Observations 38,357 38,357 21,636 56,777 56,777 34,310
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.24
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral
changes, and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality level. In columns 4-6, I repeat the same procedure
in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take the form ∆yfm =
α+ β1fm + controls+ fm, where ∆yfm denotes changes in time between commitment and verification of firm f
in municipality m. The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected in municipality m, and zero otherwise.
In columns 1-3, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of the coalition government in the 2012
elections. In columns 4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of the coalition government in
the 2008 elections. In panel A, I include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict the sample to municipalities whose
liquidity is below the median of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. In Panel C, I restrict the sample to
municipalities whose liquidity is above the median of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm and municipality levels.
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Table 1.11: Difference-in-differences: time between commitment and
verification
(firm-municipality-procurement method regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected -1.9* -1.6 1.0 0.2 0.2 -0.7
(1.0) (1.0) (2.0) (1.0) (1.2) (2.1)
Observations 84,586 84,586 60,379 84,955 84,955 60,301
R-squared 0.00 0.05 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.25
Panel B: Competitive
Connected -2.4 -2.7 4.9 1.4 1.2 3.2
(2.4) (2.6) (5.0) (3.0) (3.5) (6.0)
Observations 23,505 23,502 18,576 18,921 18,918 14,478
R-squared 0.00 0.09 0.26 0.00 0.08 0.25
Panel C: Non-competitive
Connected -1.6 -1.2 0.9 -0.2 -0.0 -1.7
(1.0) (0.9) (2.0) (1.0) (1.1) (1.8)
Observations 61,081 61,081 36,504 66,034 66,034 40,582
R-squared 0.00 0.07 0.33 0.00 0.05 0.33
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral changes,
and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality-procurement method level. In columns 4-6, I repeat the same
procedure in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take the form
∆yfmj = α+ β1fm + controls+ fmj , where ∆yfmj denotes changes in time between commitment verification of
firm f , in municipality m, through procurement method j. The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected
in municipality m, and zero otherwise. In columns 1-3, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any party of
the coalition government in the 2012 elections. In columns 4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to any
party of the coalition government in the 2008 elections. In panel A, I include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict
the sample to competitive procurement methods. In Panel C, I restrict the sample non-competitive procurement
methods. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and municipality levels.
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1.8 Appendix
1.8.1 Data sources, sample selection and variables
Data sources. The budget execution data is from the São Paulo Court of Ac-
counts (TCE-SP) and can be downloaded at http://transparencia.tce.sp.gov.br. The
electoral data (election results and campaign contributions) is available at the web-
site of the The Superior Electoral Court (TSE), http://www.tse.jus.br/. The Min-
istry of Finance provides data on the balance sheet, revenues and expenses of munic-
ipalities (available at https://www.tesouro.fazenda.gov.br/contas-anuais). Finally,
municipality characteristics (population, geographical area, literacy rate, GDP)
are available at the website of the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics
(IBGE), https://www.ibge.gov.br/.
Sample selection. The budget execution data is available from 2008 on and it
includes all municipal expenses (salaries, pensions, interest payments, machines,
equipment, food, office material, construction, consultancy services, IT services,
etc.). There are 92 classes of expenses. I select three classes that involve contracts
with private suppliers and for which the verification date is arguably a good proxy
for the delivery date: consumption material (current expenditure, class 30); material
for free distribution (current expenditure, class 32); and equipment and permanent
material (capital expenditure, class 52). The variable time between verification and
payment is winsorized at the 99% level. The TCE-SP only aggregates the data.
The municipalities collect and treat the information and send to the TCE-SP on
a yearly basis. Therefore, the quality of the data varies across municipalities. To
avoid using poorly constructed data-sets, I exclude municipality-year pairs where
more than 80% of commitments are verified on the same day of the commitment,
or paid on the same day of the verification. When this happens it suggests that
the dates of the the budget execution stages were incorrectly recorded. The data
only includes commitments that are fully executed (committed, verified and paid)
within the fiscal year. Commitments that are executed in a different fiscal year
are not available (this includes commitments that are verified but not paid, and
commitments that are not verified).
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Fiscal variables. There is a change in the accounting reports in 2013. Therefore,
I present the variables definitions for two periods, from 2007 to 2013 and from 2014
to 2017. The definitions are such that the variables are as comparable as possible
in the two periods given the information available. From 2007 to 2013, I define cash
as the sum of cash, plus deposits in banks plus short-term financial applications
(“caixa + bancos + aplicações financeiras”); accounts payable as expenses verified
but not paid (“restos a pagar processados”); revenues as current revenues (taxes,
contributions, transfers from federal and state governments) minus contributions
by pensioners and other deductions (“receitas correntes - contribuições sociais - de-
duções da receita corrente”); and wage bill as salaries, pensions and other benefits
minus non-recurring expenses (such as the payments of compensations in disputes
involving employees) (“pessoal e encargos sociais - sentenças judiciais - indenizações
restituições trabalhistas”). From 2013 to 2017, I define cash as cash and equiva-
lents (“1.1.1.0.0.00.00: caixa e equivalentes de caixa”); accounts payable as suppliers,
wages and other benefits to be paid ("2.1.1.0.0.00.00: obrigações trabalhistas, prev-
idenciárias e assistenciais a pagar a curto prazo + 2.1.3.0.0.00.00: fornecedores e
contas a pagar a curto prazo”); revenues as as current revenues (taxes, contribu-
tions, transfers from federal and state governments) minus contributions by pen-
sioners and deductions (“1.0.0.0.00.00.00 - receitas correntes - 1.2.1.0.00.00.00: con-
tribuicões sociais - deducões da receita); and wage bill as salaries, pensions and other
benefits minus non-recurring expenses (“3.1.00.00.00.00: pessoal e encargos sociais"
- 3.1.90.91.00.00: sentenças judiciais - 3.1.90.94.00.00: indenizações e restituições
trabalhista”).
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1.8.2 Figures
Figure 1.9: Procurement meethods
Purchasing method Competitive Characteristics Contract size
(for products)
Reverse auction, open to any interested firm.
Reverse auction Yes Online or in-person. Off-the-shelf goods. Any value.
Pregão Multiples bids per participant.
Waiver No Small purchase Up to BRL 8,000.
(direct contracting)
Participants are invited. Minimum of 3
Invitation to tender Yes bidders. Uninvited firms are allowed to Up to BRL 80,000.
Convite participate. One bid per participant.
Competitive bidding Yes Open to any interested bidder. Any value.
Concorrência One bid per participant.
Submission of prices Yes Bidder must be previously registered. Up to BRL 650,000.
Tomada de preços One bid per participant.
Not required No There is only one supplier. -
(direct contracting)
Contest Yes Artistic, scientific or technical works. -
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Figure 1.10: Standard deviation of time between verification and
payment: relationship with (lagged) fiscal variables
Notes: The data is aggregated at the firm-municipality-procurement-product level using monetary values as weights.
For each year, I split the sample into two groups using the medians of the liquidity measure. I repeat the procedure
for the budgetary rigidity measure. I then compute the mean of time between verification and payment for each
group. I compute liquidity as follows: (cash - accounts payable) / revenues. The budgetary rigidly measure is
defined as wage bill / revenues. The construction of both measures is explained in detail in the appendix A.1.In
2013 there is a reclassification of accounting variables, which might affect the values of fiscal variables.
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1.8.3 Tables
Table 1.12: Liquidity and rigidity - relationship with observable
municipality characteristics
Commitment Median split - liquidity Median split - rigidity
year Low High H-L Low High H-L
Panel A: Population
2008 57016 78789 21773 89977 44003 -45975
2009 55962 80821 24858 78978 57685 -21293
2010 53095 79233 26138 89446 42883 -46563
2011 46936 81509 34573 93530 34915 -58615
2012 54020 71047 17027 71665 53402 -18263
2013 43049 87394 44346 85566 47746 -37820
2014 64387 73214 8827 67450 56826 -10624
2015 64320 65970 1650 72391 50236 -22155
2016 60641 68155 7514 74599 48349 -26249
2017 75496 56318 -19178 69405 55761 -13645
Panel B: GDP per capita (in 2017 BRL)
2008 25438 30542 5103.9 30255 25530 -4724.8
2009 27631 32342 4710.9 31344 28609 -2735.4
2010 31162 33315 2152.9 35148 29329 -5818.7
2011 30330 35547 5217.1 37595 28283 -9312.4
2012 32480 35213 2733.4 37572 30121 -7450.7
2013 30701 38145 7444.7 39744 29400 -10344.2
2014 34785 37490 2704.8 40551 30749 -9801.5
2015 30946 34489 3542.4 36281 30301 -5979.7
Panel C: Literacy rate
2008 98.73 98.78 0.05 98.79 98.71 -0.08
2009 98.68 98.78 0.10 98.73 98.73 0.00
2010 98.71 98.76 0.05 98.77 98.69 -0.08
2011 98.67 98.77 0.10 98.80 98.64 -0.17
2012 98.58 98.79 0.21 98.77 98.60 -0.17
2013 98.64 98.77 0.14 98.77 98.65 -0.12
2014 98.65 98.78 0.13 98.73 98.64 -0.09
2015 98.66 98.73 0.07 98.75 98.63 -0.12
Notes: The data is aggregated at the municipality level using monetary values as weights. For each year, I split
the sample into two groups using the medians of the liquidity measure. I repeat the procedure for the budgetary
rigidity measure. I then compute the mean of the variables for each group. I compute liquidity as follows: (cash -
accounts payable) / revenues. The budgetary rigidly measure is defined as wage bill / revenues. The construction of
both measures is explained in detail in the appendix A.1.In 2013 there is a reclassification of accounting variables,
which might affect the values of fiscal variables.
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Table 1.13: Classification of firms used in Table 1.2
Year of donation (election)
Commitment Year of donation (election)
Year 2004 2008 2012
2008 connected (before) connected (after)
2009 connected (before) connected (after)
2010 connected (before) connected (after)
2011 connected (before) connected (after)
2012 connected (before) connected (after)
2013 connected (before)
2014 connected (before)
2015 connected (before)
2016 connected (before)
Notes: This table details the classification of firms used in Table 1.2. If the donation year is before the commitment
year, the firm is classified as connection (before), that is, the firm donate to the coalition government in the previous
election. Otherwise, if the donation year is after the commitment year, the firm is classified as connection (after):
it will donate after the election. The same firm can be classified as connected (before) and as connected (after).
Table 1.14: Number of observations
Number of firms
Connected Not connected
Commit. Number of observations Contracts Contracts Contracts Contracts
year Connected Not connected 1 mun. > 1 mun. 1 mun. > 1 mun.
2008 1122 238362 205 202 51620 19,846
2009 1999 242353 491 309 52116 19,759
2010 1849 250690 408 313 52884 20,134
2011 1801 262829 343 303 47124 20,997
2012 1766 275962 329 275 45565 21,390
2013 2033 279543 372 362 46931 21,501
2014 1888 285051 357 336 46233 21,626
2015 1557 254626 331 264 43822 19,662
2016 1465 258380 312 258 44309 19,981
2017 1354 275396 279 234 45912 21,105
Notes: I collapse the data at the firm-product-municipality-procurement method level. A firm is connected if it
donates to any party of the coalition government in the previous election. More specifically, a firm is connected in
2008 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2004 elections; a firm is connected in 2009, 2010, 2011 and
2012 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2008 elections; and a firm is connected in 2013, 2014, 2015 and
2016 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections. Because donations are not allowed in the 2016
elections, a firm is connected in 2017 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections.
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Table 1.15: Number of observations classified as connected, competitive x
non-competitive
Commitment Number of obs Amount committed (million BRL)
Year Compet. Non-compet. Compet. Non-compet.
2008 213 909 17.3 14.9
2009 350 1,649 29.3 18.7
2010 420 1,429 33.5 13.2
2011 393 1,408 38.7 15.6
2012 369 1,397 38.2 10.8
2013 443 1,590 78.9 13.0
2014 449 1,439 73.5 11.5
2015 359 1,198 63.8 10.1
2016 345 1,120 64.7 13.3
2017 277 1,077 43.9 6.3
Notes: I collapse the data at the firm-product-municipality-procurement method level and restrict the sample
connected firms. A firm is connected if it donates to any party of the coalition government in the previous election.
More specifically, a firm is connected in 2008 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2004 elections; a firm
is connected in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2008 elections; and a firm
is connected in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections. Because
donations are not allowed in the 2016 elections, a firm is connected in 2017 if it donates to the coalition government
in the 2012 elections.
Table 1.16: Partial correlations: cross-sectional regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Commitment Election Time between commitment
Year year and verification
2008 X 4.1*** -0.8 -0.8 -1.4
2009 2.3*** 1.9* 2.4** 0.7
2010 2.2*** -2.1* -1.9* -2.5
2011 3.6*** -0.1 0.4 0.7
2012 X 1.3* -1.5 -1.1 -0.2
2013 3.4*** -0.0 -0.1 3.0
2014 2.0*** -0.9 -0.9 0.3
2015 1.6** -1.8 -1.7 -0.1
2016 X 0.2 1.9 1.8 0.9
2017 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 0.2
Firm FE X X
Munic. FE X X X
Prod. FE X X
Procur. FE X X
Firm-party FE X
Cluster Firm & mun X X X
Notes: The table presents β’s of the following regression specification (run per commitment year): yfmpj = α +
β1fm + controls + fmpj . The dummy 1fm takes the value 1 if firm f is connected at municipality m, that is, if
the firm donates to the any party of the coalition government in the previous election. More specifically, a firm is
connected in 2008 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2004 elections; a firm is connected in 2009, 2010,
2011 and 2012 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2008 elections; and a firm is connected in 2013, 2014,
2015 and 2016 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections. Because donations are not allowed in
the 2016 elections, a firm is connected in 2017 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections.
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Table 1.17: Partial correlations: cross-sectional regressions, connection
(after)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Commitment Elect. Time between verification Log
Year year and payment (amount committed)
2008 X -1.2*** -1.4 -1.4 -1.0 0.68*** 0.26** 0.23** 0.25*
2009 -2.3*** 0.1 0.1 1.8 0.43*** 0.24*** 0.29*** 0.36***
2010 -2.4*** -0.4 -0.3 0.8 0.48*** 0.23*** 0.28*** 0.30**
2011 -1.3*** 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.44*** 0.16* 0.23*** 0.29**
2012 X -2.3*** -0.5 -0.5 0.1 0.52*** 0.30*** 0.38*** 0.55***
Firm FE X X X X
Munic. FE X X X X X X
Product FE X X X X
Procurement FE X X X X
Firm-party FE X X
Cluster Firm & mun X X X X X X
Notes: The table presents β’s of the following regression specification (run per commitment year): yfmpj = α +
β1fm + controls+ fmpj . The dummy 1fm takes the value 1 if firm f is connected (after) at municipality m, that
is, if the firm donates to the any party of the coalition government in the coming election. More specifically, a firm
is connected in 2008 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2008 elections; and a firm is connected in 2009,
2010, 2011 and 2012 if it donates to the coalition government in the 2012 elections. and a firm is connected in 2013,
2014, 2015 and 2016. Because donations are not allowed in 2016, I only report results from 2008 until 2012.
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Table 1.18: Difference-in-differences: time between verification and
payment (alternative connection measure)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected 3.5*** 2.7** 5.9** -1.4 -1.5 1.3
(1.2) (1.3) (2.5) (0.9) (1.0) (2.1)
Observations 81,342 81,342 53,489 81,212 81,212 52,421
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.31 0.00 0.11 0.32
Panel B: Low liquidity
Connected 6.6*** 6.3*** 12.0** -5.1*** -5.3*** -2.6
(2.0) (2.0) (4.7) (2.0) (2.0) (4.2)
Observations 39,486 39,486 22,288 24,319 24,319 11,296
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.34 0.00 0.11 0.41
Panel C: High liquidity
Connected 0.6 -0.5 3.5* 0.7 0.6 2.9
(1.4) (1.4) (2.0) (1.0) (0.9) (2.7)
Observations 38,106 38,106 21,459 56,777 56,777 34,310
R-squared 0.00 0.13 0.37 0.00 0.11 0.33
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral
changes, and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality level. In columns 4-6, I repeat the same procedure
in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take the form ∆yfm =
α+ β1fm + controls+ fm, where ∆yfmj denotes changes in time between verification and payment of firm f in
municipality m. The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected in municipality m, and zero otherwise. In
columns 1-3, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to the incumbent’s party in the 2012 elections. In columns
4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to the incumbent’s party in the 2008 elections. In panel A, I
include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict the sample to municipalities whose liquidity is below the median
of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. In Panel C, I restrict the sample to municipalities whose liquidity
is above the median of the liquidity measure as of December 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and
municipality levels.
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Table 1.19: Difference-in-differences: time between verification and
payment (alternative connection measure)
(firm-municipality-procurement method regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Changes around Baseline
the reforms (Sep. 2015) estimates (Sep. 2011)
Panel A: all sample
Connected 1.8* 1.5 4.2** -1.6* -1.8* -0.9
(1.1) (1.1) (2.1) (0.8) (0.9) (1.8)
Observations 84,340 84,340 60,176 84,955 84,955 60,301
R-squared 0.00 0.12 0.32 0.00 0.11 0.33
Panel B: Competitive
Connected 1.9 1.6 7.7*** -2.7 -1.9 -5.8
(2.1) (1.9) (2.8) (1.7) (1.9) (3.9)
Observations 23,456 23,453 18,547 18,921 18,918 14,478
R-squared 0.00 0.20 0.33 0.00 0.19 0.35
Panel C: Non-competitive
Connected 1.7 1.0 2.8 -1.2 -1.6 1.5
(1.3) (1.3) (2.6) (1.0) (1.2) (2.1)
Observations 60,884 60,884 36,359 66,034 66,034 40,582
R-squared 0.00 0.11 0.35 0.00 0.11 0.36
Firm FE X X
Mun. FE X X X X
Notes: In columns 1-3, I divide the sample into two periods, one year before and one year after the electoral changes,
and then I collapse the data at the firm-municipality-procurement method level. In columns 4-6, I repeat the same
procedure in the previous mayoral term, when there is no change in the electoral rules. Regressions take the form
∆yfmj = α+ β1fm + controls+ fmj , where ∆yfmj denotes changes in time between verification and payment of
firm f , in municipality m, through procurement method j. The variable 1fm takes value 1 if firm f is connected in
municipality m, and zero otherwise. In columns 1-3, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to the incumbent’s
party in the 2012 elections. In columns 4-6, a firm is classified as connected if it donates to the incumbent’s party
in the 2008 elections. In panel A, I include the entire sample. In Panel B, I restrict the sample to competitive
procurement methods. In Panel C, I restrict the sample non-competitive procurement methods. Standard errors
are clustered at the firm and municipality levels.
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The impact of the Mexican drug war
on trade
Jesús Gorrín, José Morales and Bernardo Ricca1
2.1 Introduction
Violence can affect firms in multiple ways: increasing fixed and variable pro-
duction costs by disrupting input and labor markets, changing the consumption
behavior of customers, among others. Violence is also highly regarded as an ob-
stacle for development. Sustainable Development Goal 16 from the United Nations
Development Program states:
Some regions enjoy sustained peace, security and prosperity, while
others fall into seemingly endless cycles of conflict and violence. This
is by no means inevitable and must be addressed. High levels of armed
violence and insecurity have a destructive impact on a country’s
development, affecting economic growth and often resulting in
long-standing grievances that can last for generations.
1We are grateful to Ghazala Azmat, Vicente Cuñat, Melissa Dell, Daniel Ferreira, Juanita
Gonzalez-Uribe, Ricardo Hausmann, Dirk Jenter, Tom Kirchmaier, Horacio Larreguy, Nathan
Nunn, Daniel Paravisini, Vikrant Vig, seminar participants at LSE Finance, Warwick Macro and
International Workshop, the Growth Lab Seminar at Harvard’s CID, the Development Seminar at
Harvard Economics, and the Political Economy of Development Seminar at Harvard’s Government
Department for helpful comments.
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Studying how violence affects production is key to understanding its economic
impact. This paper focuses on the effects of violence on supply. For this reason,
we examine how crime and violence affect trade, and through which margin. In
particular, does violence increase variable or fixed costs of exporting? We then
analyze the heterogenous effects of violence across different sectors of the economy.
Does violence have a stronger impact on sectors that the economic literature has
identified as more important for future growth prospects?
A growing literature has documented the economic consequences of violence.2
Yet little evidence exists on the specific mechanisms through which crime and vio-
lence affect economic outcomes. There is also lack of evidence about which sectors
of the economy are more vulnerable. It is relevant for researchers to explain how
crime and violence affect exports, potentially hampering growth opportunities. Ad-
ditionally, understanding the relationship between violence and exporting activity
is important for the design of policies aimed at attenuating the effects of crime.
A challenge to the existing literature is the endogeneity problem. Crime is cor-
related with local non-observable economic variables that affect firms’ prospects.
There is also a reverse causality concern. For instance, researchers have shown that
crime reacts to trade-induced shocks.3 Another issue is measurement error due to
underreporting. Since underreporting is correlated with regional characteristics, it
can cause biases.4 We explore a setting that helps us address most of these concerns:
the Mexican Drug War.
For several reasons, the Mexican Drug War is an appealing setting for the study
of the economic consequences of crime. First, the anti-drug policy, launched in 2006
by president Felipe Calderón, is associated with a dramatic increase in violence.
From 2006 to 2011, the homicide rate almost tripled, increasing from 7.9 per 100,000
people in 2007 to 22.9 in 2011. Second, data from surveys indicate that firms were
negatively affected. For instance, according to the World Bank Enterprise Survey,
between 2006 and 2009 the percentage of establishments paying for security increased
from 41.5% to 59%, and the percentage of establishments experiencing losses as a
2Most papers focus on violence triggered by political conflicts or terrorism. Fewer papers study
the consequences of violence triggered by property and drug-related crimes.
3See Dell, Feigenberg and Teshima (2018); and Dix-Carneiro, Soares, and Ulyssea (2018).
4See Soares (2004).
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result of theft, robbery, or vandalism doubled from 15 to 30%. Third, the war
was mainly led by one political party: the National Action Party (Partido Acción
Nacional, PAN ). The deployment of law enforcement tends to be correlated with
trends in violence. However, as proposed by Dell (2015), the fact that PAN led the
war allows us to employ an empirical strategy that uses close municipal elections as
a source of exogenous variation in the intensity of the fight against drugs.
This paper focuses on the effects of violence on trade. Exports are an important
part of the Mexican economy and a good measure of economic activity at the local
level.5 Exports are also less likely to be driven by local demand, which could be
an additional challenge to the validity of our estimates.6 We combine a regression
discontinuity design using close elections of PAN mayors with controls for foreign
demand shocks. By comparing exports of the same product to the same country
of destination in municipalities with different levels of exposure to violence, we are
able to estimate an effect of violence on the supply of exports that is unrelated to
external demand factors.7
After electing a PAN mayor in a close election, municipalities experience an
average 45% decrease in (log) export growth over 3 years, the duration of the mayoral
term. This leads to an annual decrease of 15%. We use firm-level data on exporters
from single municipalities and confirm a significant negative effect on export growth.8
In this sample, annual export growth decreases by 22% at the firm level.
To answer through which mechanism violence affects exports, we differentiate
across different margins of adjustment. Changes in trade patterns can emerge in
two dimensions: the intensive margin, which consists in pre-existing firms changing
their exported amounts, and the extensive margin, which consists in entry or exit
5The ratio exports/GDP in Mexico was 30.4% in 2005 (World Bank national accounts data).
In the same year, this ratio was 15.2% in Brazil, 23.2% in Argentina, 16.8% in Colombia, 40.2%
in Chile, and 26.8% in Peru.
6Local demand shocks can affect firms through the internal capital markets channel, that is,
firms that sell to the domestic market and are financially constrained might be less able to export.
On the other hand, Almunia, Antràs, Lopez-Rodriguez, and Morales (2018) argue that negative
local demand shocks can cause an increase in exports because short-term marginal costs decrease.
7See Paravisini, Rappoport, Schnabl, and Wolfenzon (2014), who implement a similar strategy
of comparing exports of the same product to the same destination to estimate the impact of bank
credit shocks on trade.
8The micro-data does not allow us to differentiate exports coming from a particular municipality
when firms have multiple plants in the same state. This restriction is applied to guarantee the
correct assignment of the municipality where exports are produced.
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of firms into different markets. If increases in violence manifest in the form of
marginal cost increases, we should observe decreases in the intensive margin. If the
effect comes from an increase in fixed costs of exporting, this would change exporting
decisions at the extensive margin.9 At the firm level, our results show significant
effects only on the intensive margin. The main implication of this finding is that
violence only seems to increase marginal costs of exporting.
We also explore the heterogeneity of the effect across product characteristics. We
first use the complexity classification defined by Hausmann et al. (2013). We find
that exports of more complex products – the ones that require more knowledge and
complementary capacities to be produced – are more affected. Export growth of
the more complex products drops by 65% over 3 years. The effect is not significant
for less complex products. The fact that the effect is concentrated in knowledge-
and coordination-intensive products can be relevant for future local economic per-
formance as complexity correlates with future economic growth (Hausmann et al.,
2013).
Other results are consistent with the hypothesis that violence has a larger effect
on products that require higher specialization. Analyzing firm-level data, we also
find larger negative effects of PAN wins on larger exporting firms. Furthermore,
building on previous work in the literature, we construct product level measures of
capital and skill intensity (Shirotori et al., 2010), and external capital dependence
(Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). We show that export growth of products that rely
more on long-term capital, skill intensity, and external sources of capital suffer a
larger decrease. The types of firms that are more affected – large, capital- and skill-
intensive – are also the ones that are more likely to gain from exporting in the first
place.10 We also find suggestive evidence of a decrease in foreign direct investment
on municipalities where PAN won close elections.
As a criticism to our identification strategy, it can be argued that the negative
effects on exports are caused by the PAN government itself, rather than violence.
This is unlikely to be the case. In the absence of the Drug War, municipalities
governed by PAN are likely to receive an economic benefit for several reasons. PAN is
9See Melitz (2003).
10See Mayer and Ottaviano (2008).
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deemed a more market-friendly party. The federal administration is likely to benefit
PAN municipalities, since they belong to the same party.11 Potential spillovers to the
control group attenuate the effects. All these biases underestimate the hypothesized
negative effects of crime and violence on the economy. Because of these reasons, we
could theoretically argue that our results offer a lower bound of the negative effects
of violence on trade.
Nonetheless, we do not rely solely on a theoretical argument to pinpoint the
likelihood that our estimates provide a lower bound. We provide empirical evidence.
We perform a series of tests to show the results are unlikely to be driven by other
PAN policies besides the war on drugs. First, because at the onset of the war, most of
the violence concentrated in the northern regions of the country, we split the sample
into two parts: north and south. As ex-ante violence is an important determinant
of the deployment of law enforcement, a PAN municipality in the South was less
likely to be affected by the war, but still experienced the results of policies that are
specific to this political party. We find that the effect is only present in the northern
regions. In the southern regions, a close PAN win is associated with an increase in
export growth. Then, we use data collected by Coscia and Rios (2012) to define
municipalities with ex-ante drug cartel activity. The drug war explicitly targeted
these illegal organizations, and, therefore, was implemented mostly in places with
pre-existing high cartel activity. The results are similar to the North vs South split:
municipalities with pre-existing cartel presence experience a significant decrease in
export growth after a close PAN win. In the absence of pre-existing cartel activity,
close PAN wins are correlated with an increase in export growth. Finally, we run
placebo tests using previous local elections. We find that, in the absence of the war
on drugs, the effect of a PAN win on export growth is smaller and not statistically
significant.
Our paper builds on the literature that investigates the negative economic effects
of crime, violence and political conflicts. In an interesting contemporaneous paper,
Utar (2018) shows that an increase in violence driven by the drug war in Mexico gen-
erates a decrease in production to local markets, but not a decrease in exports. Our
11Azulai (2017) shows, in the context of Brazil, that partisan connections distort the allocation
of public goods towards localities with connected authorities.
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main results conflict with this finding. An important difference between the papers
is the identification strategy. While Utar (2018) controls for firm-level unobservable
characteristics, in that paper the instrument for local violence is the interaction be-
tween cartel baseline presence, the choice of the governor to join the drug war, and
the estimated price of cocaine. On the other hand, our paper exploits a different
source of exogeneity that is unlikely to be related with unobserved local character-
istics: close elections. Furthermore, her analysis excludes “maquiladoras”, which are
concentrated in the areas more likely to be affected by the drug violence (the North
of Mexico), and are also an important source of Mexican exports. Moreover, the
survey sample in Utar (2018) over represents larger firms. Our paper covers a larger
sample of exporters using administrative export data that is more likely to represent
smaller firms. On the positive side, because of the level of detail of her survey data,
Utar (2018) is able to test for internal trade, and for internal characteristics of the
workforce by plants of the same firm across different municipalities. Our paper does
not test for heterogeneous effects on the workforce or changes in internal trade.
Other relevant papers in this literature include Ksoll, Macchiavello and Morjaria
(2016), who study the effects of electoral violence on exports. They focus their
analysis on one product – flowers – and they explore a different shock to violence.
They find that export volumes decrease and that worker absenteeism is one of the
drivers of the result. Pshisva and Suarez (2010) use firm-level data in Colombia to
analyze the impact of kidnappings on corporate investment. They show that firm
investment is negatively correlated with kidnappings that target firm owners and
managers. Rozo (2018) uses firm level data and heterogeneous provision of gov-
ernment security in Colombia to show that violence decreases production through
a decrease in output prices. She also finds negative effects on exit. Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2003) explore the unilateral truce declared by ETA in 1998 and find
that stocks of firms with a significant part of their business in the Basque Country
showed a positive relative performance. Besley and Mueller (2012) find a nega-
tive relationship between killings and house prices in Northern Ireland. Similarly,
Frischtak and Mandel (2012) provide evidence that the pacification of favelas caused
an increase in house prices in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Other papers have studied the
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negative effects of violence on local labor markets.12
We also relate to the literature that explores the effects of the Mexican Drug
War. Dell (2015) finds negative effects of the war on local violence levels, while
Utar (2018) finds negative effects on production for the national market. Our study
advances the literature and finds negative consequences of the Drug War on local
exports controlling for external demand factors, hence identifying a shock on the
local capacity to supply foreign markets. We also provide further evidence on the
mechanism through which the effects may operate. Violence acts as an increase in
marginal costs. The negative effects are concentrated on larger exporters, and on
exporters in more capital (human and physical) and finance dependent industries.
Our suggestive evidence of negative effects of the Drug War on greenfield investments
at the municipality level complements the work by Ashby and Ramos (2013), who
document a negative relationship between crime and FDI at the state level in Mexico.
Our results suggest that policies that actively engage in violence against drug
trafficking can have important unintended negative consequences for the economy.
They seem to hamper local export growth of large exporters focusing on complex,
capital-intensive, skill-intensive and finance-dependent products. The effect con-
centrates on the intensive margin, suggesting violence increases marginal exporting
costs and not fixed costs of sustaining trading relationships. Finally, violence in-
creases driven by stricter drug policy enforcement seem to hamper the capacity of
localities to attract productive investments.
The paper continues as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical setting of the
Mexican drug war and outlines our empirical strategy. Section 3 presents descriptive
statistics. Section 4 outlines the effects of the Mexican drug war on violence. Section
5 presents results on exports at the municipality level. Section 6 presents results
on exports at the firm level. Section 7 presents results on greenfield FDI at the
municipality level. Section 8 concludes.
12See Adhikari (2013), Clemens (2017), Chamarbagwala and Morán (2011), Ihlanfeldt (2007).
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2.2 Empirical setting
2.2.1 The Mexican political landscape and the Drug War
Throughout most of the twentieth century, Mexico experienced a non democratic
rule with single party domination. For 71 years, the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI ) ruled the country. Elections ex-
isted, but they were not competitive. In the 1990s, politicians from different parties
started winning local elections, and, in 2000, Mexico elected its first non-PRI pres-
ident since 1929. Some analysts suggest that, during PRI rule, there was a tacit
agreement between the government and the drug traffickers that allowed cartels to
operate as long as they complied with some rules (O’Neil, 2009). For example, cartels
could not cause major disruptions to civilian life. Importantly, violence was con-
tained. When other parties started winning elections, this relationship was shaken,
as cartels had to negotiate with new incumbents from other parties. The election of
Vicente Fox (PAN) as president in 2000 triggered some institutional changes. At the
time, these changes were limited because the PAN was outnumbered in congress. It
was only on 2 July 2006, when Felipe Calderón (PAN) was elected president, that
changes intensified. Calderón governed from 1 December 2006 until 30 November
2012. As soon as he took office, he declared the war on drugs, sending the army to
several provinces. The policy had tragic consequences. The arrest or assassination
of a kingpin can cause a violent dispute for power. Members from the same orga-
nization or from rival cartels can exploit the weakening of the leadership to try to
gain the control of the organization. Once in charge, new leaders have to assert their
authority, in many cases through the use of force. Cartels also retaliated against
politicians, police officers, armed forces, and journalists.
Increases in violence also affected civilian life. During Calderón’s administration,
the number of homicides increased by 160%, from 10,452 in 2006 to 27,213 in 2011
(Figure 2.1). Total homicides between 2006 and 2011 – as well as the absolute
increase from the total between 2001 and 2005 – were concentrated in the northern
regions of the country, closer to the US border (Figure 2.2). These are the regions
where the main cartels operate the smuggling of drugs into the US. In reaction to the
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crackdown, there is evidence that cartels began to diversify their activities into other
crimes, such as extortion, human trafficking, oil theft, kidnapping, and robbery.
The main strategy of the anti-drug policy targeted cartel leaders. We gath-
ered information for all confirmed deaths and arrests of highly ranked members of
nine different Mexican cartels.13 During the Calderón’s presidency, governmental
authorities carried out 13 killings and 54 arrests over 49 Mexican municipalities.
These operations were mainly organized at the federal level, but coordination with
municipal police was important.
Municipal presidents, the Mexican equivalent of mayors, are elected by popular
vote. At the time of the war on drugs, Mexico already had competitive elections.
All municipalities and states in Mexico control a police force. The municipality has
the power to remove or appoint the municipal police chief. According to Article 115
of the Mexican Constitution, the municipal police has the responsibility to provide
security and prevent crime. The important role of the mayor in the implementation
of the Drug War can also be seen in practice. From 2006 until 2014, organized crime
killed 63 former mayors or mayors in office.14 Furthermore, municipal presidents
have denounced extorsion from cartels.15 Hence, it is reasonable to assume municipal
elections are an important source of variation in the way the Drug War policy was
implemented at the local level. This assumption is crucial for our identification.
Mexican parties are quite heterogeneous in their preferred social and economic
policies. Among the major parties, PAN is more economically liberal and business
oriented than its national opponents. As evidence of this, PAN was elected on
an economic platform based on globalization and an increase in foreign investment
(Krauze, 2006). Its main rival in the 2006 elections, the Party of the Democratic
Revolution (Partido de la Revolución Democrática, PRD), is suspicious of free mar-
kets and globalization. Its other rival, the PRI, is more diverse. However, PAN was
also more politically conservative. Especially during Calderón’s presidency, PAN
pursued heavier enforcement of anti-drug policies.
13See “Mexico Drug War Fast Facts” (https://edition.cnn.com/2013/09/02/world/
americas/mexico-drug-war-fast-facts/index.html) and “Timeline of the Mexican Drug War”
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Mexican_Drug_War).
14Webpage: https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2018/04/13/violencia-contra-los-alcaldes-en-mexico-
mas-de-100-asesinados-desde-2006/.
15Webpage: http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/165947.html.
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2.2.2 Data
We collect data on local electoral results from the Electoral Tribunals of each
state. Local elections are held every three years, and usually elections in different
states happen at different times. We focus on municipalities with elections in 2007
and 2008 because the terms of mayors elected in those years started and finished
during Calderón’s administration. Monthly data on homicides are from the National
Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía,
INEGI ), available since 1990. Data on other types of crimes tend to be noisier due to
underreporting. The issue of underreporting is severe in developing countries, where
both the police and victims do not report all crimes. The most reliable source of
crime data at the municipality level is The National Public Security System (Sis-
tema Nacional de Seguridad Pública, SNSP), which started to publish data in 2011.
Data on municipality characteristics are from the National System of Municipal In-
formation (Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal, SNIM ). Municipal data on
exports are from the Atlas of Economic Complexity, which was developed at Har-
vard’s Center for International Development.16 We also use firm level data from the
Mexican Tax Administration Service.17
2.2.3 Empirical strategy
Governments allocate their enforcement arms to regions where violence is in-
creasing. Therefore a regression of homicides on some measure of law enforcement
provides biased results. To address this challenge, we identify the effect of the drug
war on violence using heterogeneity in electoral outcomes. First, we use the fact
that one party, PAN, implemented stronger actions against the Mexican drug car-
tels. Thus, following Dell (2015), we use close elections of a PAN mayor as a source
of exogenous variation in the intensity of the war on drugs. We focus the analysis
on the 2007 and 2008 elections. The administration of mayors elected in those years
started at the beginning of the war, and finished around its peak, in 2011. We
16Webpage: http://complejidad.datos.gob.mx. The original data comes from the Tax Ad-
ministration Service (Servicio de Administración Tributaria, SAT), Mexican’s customs authority.
17Micro-level data is not publicly available. We accessed these data at Harvard’s Center for
International Development.
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estimate the following specification
ym = α + βPANwinm + δf(Marginm, PANwinm) + m (2.1)
where m denotes municipalities, PANwinm is a dummy variable that takes value 1
when PAN wins, and f(Marginm, PANwinm) is a polynomial on the vote margin
and the dummy of PAN victory. We restrict the sample to municipalities where
PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%. Our contribution is to show the
negative effect of violence on exports, and potential mechanisms behind this effect.
However, since the source of exogeneity is given by the close PAN election, we first
need to associate a PAN win with an increase violence. We follow the previous
literature that has identified this effect. As in Dell (2015), we test the effect on
homicides. Furthermore, following anecdotal evidence that cartels diversified their
activities during the war, we also test the effects on other crimes. Because it is likely
that crime is under-reported in smaller municipalities, we weight for population size.
As suggested by Solon et al. (2015), we always report robust standard errors when
weighting.
We then estimate “reduced-form” regressions using trade variables as dependant
variables. The trade data are at the municipality-product-country of destination
level, which allows us to control for external demand shocks by including product-
destination dummies. Regressions take the form:
ymcp = α + βPANwinm + δf(Marginm, PANwinm) + αcp + mcp (2.2)
where ymcp is the growth over the entire mayoral term (3 years) in exports of product
p to country c in municipality m. More specifically, ymcp is the log of the amount
exported in the third year of the new administration, divided by the amount ex-
ported in the third year of the previous administration, when elections took place.18
αcp is a set of country of destination-product dummies, which allows us to control
for foreign demand shocks, as in Paravisini et al. (2014).
We follow a similar procedure when using firm level data. To guarantee we
18The impact on annual log of exports growth is β/3.
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identify the correct municipality from which exports of a given firm are produced,
we restrict the data to firms that produce only from one municipality in a given
Mexican state.19 We then estimate a regression analogous to equation 2.2, but
using firm-product-destination data. The municipality is identified by the location
of the firm’s plants.
2.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for municipalities that held elections in
2007 and 2008. Panel A shows socioeconomic characteristics of each Mexican mu-
nicipality. In terms of population, municipalities are small. They have, on average,
35 thousand inhabitants compared to 100 thousand for the average county in the
US. Furthermore, by 2006, compared to the US, Mexico was already a violent coun-
try. The American rate of 6 homicides per 100,000 pales in comparison to 11.7 in
Mexico. However, compared to some Latin American countries, such as Brazil (26),
Colombia (37), Venezuela (49), and El Salvador (58), Mexico’s homicide rate was
relatively small in 2006 (Berthet and Lopez, 2011). Although PAN was already an
important party, only 27% of municipalities had an incumbent PAN mayor. Mu-
nicipalities that elected PAN mayors (treatment group) are richer, less violent and
have a higher share of the population aged between 16 and 29, in comparison to
municipalities that did not elect PAN mayors (control group). However, once the
sample is limited to municipalities where PAN won or lost by a small margin, the
baseline characteristics are not statistically different in the treatment and control
groups. Moreover, the loss of power caused by the restriction of the sample does not
drive the results. For all significantly different variables in the unrestricted sample,
we see smaller differences when we restrict to the 5% spread. The lack of difference
on observables provides reassuring evidence in favor of the assumption of random
assignment in close PAN victories.
19When firms have multiple plants in the same state, but in different municipalities, the data
do not allow us to precisely determine which plant produced the exports. Therefore, in our main
firm level regressions we decided to apply this restriction. If we do not restrict the sample and use
firm level employees by municipalities to pro-rata assign firm exports to a particular municipality,
we find consistent results.
75
Chapter 2
Table 2.1 Panel B shows characteristics related to trade. Municipalities where
PAN was elected tend to export more ex-ante. In general, the differences are not
statistically significant for the unrestricted sample; for the sample that is restricted
to municipalities facing close elections, all differences are statistically insignificant.
In imports we observe a similar pattern.
Panel A of Figure 2.3 shows the geographical distribution of all municipalities in
which elections took place in 2007 and 2008, while Panel B shows the geographical
distribution of close elections in the same years. In the unconditional sample we can
see that, even though PAN wins are not clustered, the losses are. We also see that
PAN loses the majority of the municipal elections. However, when we restrict the
sample to municipalities with close elections, the distribution of losses and wins are
regionally dispersed. This is important for our identification for two reasons. First,
this undermines the possibility that regional shocks, and not the treatment, drive
our results. Second, it diminishes concerns of spillovers in control municipalities
when restricting to the close elections sample.
2.4 Effects on violence
Panel A of Table 2.2 shows the results of estimation of Equation 2.1 when the
outcome variable is the annual average of homicides over the new incumbent’s term.
Regressions are weighted by population size as of 2005. In the baseline WLS regres-
sion, a PAN victory causes an increase between 25 and 41 homicides per 100,000
population.
Panel A of Figure 2.4 replicates the finding of Dell (2005), which is crucial for
our identification. This graph shows there is a discontinuous and significant effect
of a close PAN election on cumulative homicides after the election.20
Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that a PAN victory is not associated with any pre-
trend increase in homicides: municipalities where PAN won by a close margin do not
experience higher homicides rates before the election. Panel C analyses the impact
20Our sample of close elections is slightly different from Dell (2015). In Dell’s paper there is an
additional restriction given by the availability of confidential data on drug transportation routes.
In our paper this restriction is not necessary. However, even with this difference, the results are
very similar in economic magnitude and in statistical significance.
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on the absolute change in homicides: before and after the elections. A PAN win
is associated with an increase of 37 in the homicide rate. In Panel D, we use the
2004 and 2005 elections to run a placebo test. Most mayors elected in this period
finished their terms before the start of the war on drugs. The regression in Panel
D helps us identify the effect of a PAN win on violence in the absence of the war
on drugs. The results in this placebo show that close PAN wins are not associated
with higher homicides in periods outside the war on drugs. This result suggests that
a PAN victory in itself did not cause higher violence at the municipality level. It
seems that the main driver of violence was the combination of a PAN victory with
the implementation of the war on drugs.
Table 2.15 in the Appendix reports the same regressions when we restrict the
sample to municipalities where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 3%. The
results are consistent. Coefficients increase slightly and remain significant at 5%.
Results are also similar when we increase the degree of the RD polynomial (Table
2.16 in the Appendix).
A natural question is whether the incidence of other types of crime also in-
creased. It could be the case that homicides were concentrated in the war between
rival cartels and the war between state and cartels. In this scenario, other crimes,
such as robbery, kidnapping, and extortion, could remain unchanged. There are
some limitations in documenting the effects on other crimes. Data is noisier due
to underreporting. Furthermore, the most reliable source started publishing crime
statistics per municipality only in 2011. Therefore, differently from homicides where
we could test the impact over the whole term, we can only test the impact on the
level observed in 2011, and we cannot run a placebo test with previous elections.
Table 2.17 in the appendix reports results for six different types of crime. In gen-
eral, other types of crime also increase, but the effects are not always statistically
significant. Effects on extortion and robbery are statistically significant.
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2.5 Change in municipalities’ exports
2.5.1 Main results
In this section we combine the identification based on close municipal elections
with disaggregated trade data at the municipal-product-destination level. Our focus
on export growth combined with disaggregated data allows us to concentrate on
supply effects.
This approach is different from the rest of the literature studying the effects of
violence in the economy. Violence can have effects on both the demand and the
capacity of firms to supply goods. For example, violence could potentially affect the
economy by diminishing the likelihood or capacity of individuals to consume certain
type of goods; it could disrupt production by increasing costs; it could could drive
workers out of the affected locality. If we study local production instead of exports,
we are not able to disentangle the effects on supply and demand. As we concentrate
on exports, we can keep demand factors fixed (or at least exogenous to the local
shock) and estimate an effect that is driven by a drop in the growth rate of the
production of goods.
Importantly, the disaggregated municipality-product-destination data allows us
to control for regional specialization in serving foreign markets. Comparing across
the same product-destination diminishes concerns that the effects are driven by
particular regions that export certain types of goods.
Regressions on export outcomes follow equation 2.2. We test whether the Drug
War affected export growth. For each municipalitym, we observe the annual amount
(in Pesos) of product p exported to country c. There is one caveat about the data.
When a firm has a single plant or all their plants are in the same municipality,
the exports reflect directly the municipality. When firms have multiple plants in
different municipalities within the same state, then an approximation is made based
on the workforce of each plant. We deal with this issue in the next section of the
paper, in which we study firm micro level data.
In Table 2.3, we report the regressions of export growth on close PAN wins
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using the same weighting by population.21. When we control for destination-product
dummies, (log of) export growth decrease by 45% over the mayoral term, or 15%
annually. These controls also alleviate concerns that differential changes in the terms
of trade of certain products drive the result. Therefore, after the implementation
of the Drug War, municipalities performed worse in terms of trade even when the
more open party, PAN, was elected. Figure 2.5 shows there is a discontinuous and
significantly negative effect of a close PAN election on log export growth after the
election.
2.5.2 Placebos
Regarding the identification assumptions behind our empirical strategy, random
assignment of close PAN wins is not enough to draw conclusions about the actual
effects of violence. We need to show that the under-performance was not triggered
by the election of the PAN itself and the particular economic policies that the party
advocates, but by the propensity to engage in the war on drugs and the ensuing
violence that it caused. To address this concern, we provide placebo estimates of
the same specification for the 2004-2005 elections. Data is available from 2004, so
we take export growth until 2007, the first year of the Drug War.22 Table 2.4 reports
the results. Before the Drug War, the close PAN wins had a negative – 20% over 2
years, or 10% annually – but not statistically significant effect on exports growth.
We also perform two placebo tests during the period of the war on drugs. Ex-ante
cartel presence and high levels of violence were drivers of enforcement operations
during the war. Therefore, locations with a PAN mayor but no cartel presence
and low violence were less likely to be the target of anti-drug operations, but still
experienced policies implemented by the PAN. If in those locations a PAN win is
not associated with a decrease in exports, then we can conclude that it is not the
PAN victory itself that is causing our main result. We thus exploit heterogeneity
in the potential intensity of the war on drugs by splitting our analysis in areas that
experienced different levels of drug-related activity and violence before the war.
We explore the prevalence of pre-existing violence and cartel activity in the North
21Results are robust in the standard OLS regression.
22The Drug War started in December 2006.
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of the country, close to the US border. Most of the drug-trafficking organizations
operate in this region, where the ports of entry to the US (the main consumer
market) are located. We split the data into two parts: North and South. We then
complement the analysis by using data collected by Coscia and Rios (2012) on cartel
presence at the municipal level in Mexico. We split the sample using the presence
of any cartel at the beginning of the drug war.23
In Table 2.5, Panel A, we show that the effect of a close PAN win on exports is
significantly negative in the North of the country. Panel B shows the effect is either
positive or indistinguishable from zero in southern municipalities. This supports the
interpretation that our estimate is a lower bound of the negative effects on exports.
In municipalities where the drug war was less prevalent, PAN had higher export
growth on average.
In Table 2.5, Panel C, we show a similar pattern for municipalities with pre-
existing cartel presence. The negative effect on export growth is only significant in
municipalities with pre-existing cartel presence. In Panel D, when controlling for
product-destination fixed effects, PAN wins in municipalities with no cartel presence
experienced a significantly positive growth after the election.
2.5.3 Complexity Heterogeneity
We separate the results according to the degree of complexity in different prod-
ucts. We use the Product Complexity Index (PCI) from the Atlas of Economic
Complexity developed by Hausmann et al. (2013) to classify products. This mea-
sure uses trade data to determine the complexity of a product according to two
characteristics: ubiquity and the average diversity of its exporters. In theory, a
more complex product is produced by countries that export many products, but it
is also produced by few countries. The measure tries to capture how complex it
is to produce a given product. Table 2.18 in the appendix shows a list of prod-
23Coscia and Rios (2012) collect data from relevant web sources such as newspapers and blogs on
Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTO) activities in Mexican municipalities using an automatized
system. However, there are some limitations in the ability to collect information since powerful
cartels can suppress it (Wainwright, 2016). This problem can be especially prevalent in badly
governed municipalities. Using the measure directly to predict violence could introduce a bias.
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that this potential bias is correlated with the close election outcomes.
This is why the main source of variation that we use is still the close election result.
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ucts by their level of complexity in 2007. Complexity correlates with future GDP
growth, and complex economies tend to grow more (Hausmann et al., 2013). If the
Drug War affected more complex products, then the long term effects could be more
pernicious.
In Table 2.6 we report a monotonic pattern in export growth. We divide products
into four quartiles depending on how they rank in terms of the economic complexity
index. For low complexity the effects on export growth are indistinguishable from
zero, or positive if we control for product-destination dummies. The higher the com-
plexity the more negative and significant the effects on export’s growth. This result
suggests that in the treated municipalities the negative impacts are concentrated in
more complex industries.
2.6 Change in firms’ exports
In this section we proceed to estimate the effects at the firm level. The nature of
the electoral discontinuity allows us to study the economic effects of increased vio-
lence at a microeconomic level by identifying firms’ municipal locations. A potential
concern with the municipality-level export data is that it is constructed assuming a
distribution of firms’ exports when firms own plants in multiple municipalities. The
geographical distribution of exports is assumed to be in line with the distribution
of a firm’s workforce as expressed in social security records. To verify that this
assumption is not problematic, we validate results with firm-level export data for a
sample of firms that operate in a single municipality of a state in every given year.
Using administrative sources on transaction-level customs data and firm-level social
security data, we assess the intensive-margin growth in exports and the extensive-
margin disappearance of export relationships at the firm, product and country of
destination level, while also allowing for the inclusion of industry-level fixed-effects
that control for sector-wide dynamics in firms’ main activity.24
24These anonymized sources were provided by the Mexican Social Security and Tax Authorities
as inputs for the development of the Mexican Atlas of Economic Complexity. We worked with
this data locally at Harvard’s Center for International Development, which partnered with the
Mexican government in developing this data visualization tool. Information about the Mexican
Atlas of Economic Complexity is available at http://complejidad.datos.gob.mx.
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At the intensive margin, we estimate the following equation:
log
[X t′fmpc
X tfmpc
] 1
t′−t
 = β0+β1PANwinm+δf(Marginm, PANwinm)+ψpc+κi+fmcp
(2.3)
Where X tfmpc stands for the exports of firm f of product p to country of des-
tination c, located in municipality m in baseline year t. The dependent variable
captures the logarithm of the average yearly growth factor in total exports at the
firm, product and country of destination level between years t and t′. β1 captures the
percent difference in the average yearly growth factor of the exports by firm-product-
destination for firms marginally exposed to a PAN mayor in their municipality. ψpc
stands for product-country of destination fixed-effects that control for external de-
mand, and κi stands for industry fixed-effects that control for factors that are fixed
for the main activity of every firm in the data. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level, which is the level of the treatment. As with the main specifica-
tions in the municipality-level analysis, the bandwidth for close elections is 5% and
we use linear controls on both sides of the electoral discontinuity.
2.6.1 Main Results
Table 2.7 shows how firm-level specifications largely validate municipality level
results at the intensive margin. For the sample of municipalities with close elections
in 2007 and 2008, a marginal PAN victory associates with a 21% drop in the annual
growth factor of firm exports between 2007 and 2010.
Panel A of Table 2.8 shows that the effect of a Marginal PAN victory in 2007/2008
on future export growth is still observed into 2013, after the US economic crisis had
largely subsided. Hence, we believe these results are not contingent on the crisis.
Panels B and C of Table 2.8 evaluate the short- and long-term effects of a marginal
PAN victory on the probability of a firm to lose an export relationship with a foreign
country for a given product. Results largely show a null effect. In the context of
the negative and significant effects observed at the intensive margin, the evidence is
consistent with firms adapting to the increasingly violent environment by reducing
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the intensity of their ongoing export relationships, but not by disproportionately
rescinding on these relationships. This finding can be interpreted as consequence of
increasing marginal costs of exporting, assuming there exist fixed and sunk costs of
developing export relationships.25 The lack of changes in exit suggests fixed costs
of exporting do not change significantly after increases in violence.
2.6.2 Placebos
We repeat the placebo tests that we performed in the municipality regressions.
Table 2.9 shows similar specifications applied for a placebo sample of municipalities
with close elections in 2004 and 2005. With product-destination fixed effects, a close
PAN victory is associated with an increase in exports. However, when we include
industry fixed effects, the effect becomes negative, and, even though its magnitude
is around half of the magnitude obtained with the 2007 and 2008 elections, it is
significant at 10%. These results provide evidence that the effects of a marginal
PAN victory are significantly contingent to the period of the war on drugs.
Table 2.10 shows similar regression discontinuity estimates, evaluating how the
effects of a marginal PAN victory are contingent on baseline cartel presence. Panel A
shows results for the sample of municipalities with close elections in 2007 and 2008.
Regressions in columns 1 and 3 show that a marginal PAN win in municipalities
with baseline cartel presence associates with a 20% drop in export growth rates
between 2007 and 2010, while regressions in columns 2 and 4 show null effects in
municipalities without baseline cartel presence. Panel B shows similar estimates for
a placebo sample of municipalities with close elections in 2004 and 2005, showing
null estimates throughout.
Table 2.11 follows a similar strategy for the north-south split. For Panel A,
regressions in columns 1 and 3 show that a marginal PAN win in northern munic-
ipalities also associates with a 14% to 26% drop in export growth rates between
2007 and 2010, while regressions in columns 2 and 4 show null effects in southern
municipalities. Panel B shows results for the sample of municipalities with close
25For a theoretical motivation behind the margins of adjustment see Melitz (2003), and for
an estimation on the relevance of each method of adjustment in trade see Helpman, Melitz, and
Rubinstein (2008).
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elections in 2004 and 2005, before the war on drugs.
2.6.3 Effect Heterogeneity: Size, Product Complexity and
Input dependence
There are many possible mechanisms through which violence may disrupt the
exporting activities of local firms. Violence may prevent a firm’s capacity to source
the necessary human capital for its operations; it may hamper the capacity for firms
to raise capital and leverage their operations; and it may disrupt the transportation
of inputs and outputs. Effects may be more relevant for smaller firms on which the
added operating costs of violence may be more onerous, or for larger firms for which
parts of the production process may be more exposed to the disruption caused by
crime.
Ideally, to assess which of these channels may be operating, we would evaluate
how a firm’s size and its reliance on human capital, capital, finance and transporta-
tion services affect the the impact of a marginal PAN victory on exports. However,
given the features of our administrative data, we can only make this assessment
directly for the workforce size of exporters. Nevertheless, we also construct metrics
of input dependence at the exported product level. We use them to assess whether
the negative effects are larger for product groups that disproportionately depend on
a given input.
For exporter size, we split the sample of exporters around the median size of the
workforce, using the distribution of single-municipality exporters as of 2007. Fur-
thermore, we test for five different product segmentation measures.26 The measures
are suggestive of the channels through which violence might be affecting export
growth:
• Product Complexity: This metric from Hausmann et al. (2013) empirically
approximates the diversity on the productive capacities required to export a
product competitively from a given country. Hence, it can be thought of as a
26All input dependence metrics are converted into the 1992 version of the Harmonized System
of product classification. Export data for some products cannot be matched to input dependence
scores, so that export data for these products cannot be used for the subsequent analyses.
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measure of the intensity of input complementarities for the output of a given
product.
• Capital dependence: This metric from Shirotori et al. (2010) captures the
Revealed Capital Intensity of the product from international trade patterns
and national capital endowments of their competitive exporters.
• Human capital dependence: Also from Shirotori et al. (2010), this measure
captures the Revealed Human Capital Intensity of the product from interna-
tional trade and national human capital endowment patterns.
• Finance dependence: This metric from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and sub-
sequent work by Lamont et al. (2001), measures a product’s dependence on
external capital for its production. Cash crops with fast turnaround – like
tobacco – are in the bottom of the finance dependence list, while sectors that
require long-term risky investments and higher working capital – like medicines
– are in the top of the list.
• Trucking dependence: We build this metric according to a product’s realized
dependence on trucking services as measured in the US input-output tables.
Table 2.12 shows the correlations between the product complexity and input
dependence scores for long-term capital, human capital, complexity, external finance
dependence, and trucking dependence. We can see there is a positive and high
correlation between complexity, long-term capital and human capital dependence.
This is expected. Complexity is supposed to capture how difficult it is to produce
a good, which is correlated to skill dependence.27 Likewise, the macroeconomics’s
literature has provided empirical evidence of complementarities between long-term
capital and human capital.28 Therefore, it is natural that both measures are highly
correlated.
On the other hand, external capital dependence exhibits lower correlation with
other measures. Trucking dependence is not correlated with measures of either com-
27See Hausmann et al. (2013).
28See Lewis (2011).
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plexity, long-term capital, and human capital dependence. It is negatively correlated
with external capital dependence.
Table 2.13 shows regression discontinuity estimates of the effects of a PAN victory
in a close municipality election in 2007 and 2008 on export growth between 2007
and 2010, conditioning for exporter size groups or for product groups divided by the
relevant input dependence measure. For exporter’s size we divide the sample into
large and small according to the median size of the workforce. The segmentation
on high and low levels of complexity or input dependence was divided according
to their respective median values in the product distribution. Panel A includes
product-country of destination fixed effects, which is the micro data analogous to
the regressions we estimate at the municipality level. Panel B adds industry fixed
effects.
Results in Table 2.13 suggest that the negative effects of the war on drugs are
either contingent to or appear more detrimental for larger exporters. In our preferred
specification, Panel A, we observe that a PAN win is correlated with a 27% decrease
in export growth at the firm-product-destination only for large exporters. Small
exporters suffer no significant change in any of the two specifications.
Firms exporting high complexity products suffer a 27% decrease in their exports
located in a municipality with close PAN win in comparison to firms exporting the
same product to the same destination in the control group. The results are insignifi-
cant for low complexity products. Firms producing capital intensive products suffer
a decrease between 32 and 34% in export growth. There is no effect in industries
with low capital intensity. Similarly, firms producing products with high human
capital dependence and located in a municipality with a close PAN win, experience
a decrease of 27% in export growth. There is a negative, but much smaller and not
statistically significant effect on products that require low levels of human capital.
The results in these product level divisions are consistent with the result that vi-
olence affects exports in sectors that require a more complex production process,
more capital investments, and more specialized factors of production.
We now turn to the question of financing. The production of certain goods can
rely more on the use of external financing, where external financing refers to the use
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of funds from outside investors. Even though the estimates are negative and sta-
tistically significant only for high finance dependence, they only seem economically
different for the Panel B specification that adds fixed effects for the main activity
of the firm. Therefore, the evidence on this channel is more mixed.
Another important question is whether violence decreases exports by increasing
transportation costs in affected localities. To test this hypothesis we split the sample
according to the measure of trucking service dependence. Our results show no
evidence of firms with more trucking dependence having a larger decrease in export
growth. The results are the opposite. However, this could be partially explained by
the fact this the measure is constructed using US data.
The learning from this exercise is consistent with important stylized facts of
trade. Exporters tend to be firms that rely more on fixed capital and skill inten-
sity.29 In our results, the negative effect on exports is more pronounced precisely on
these sectors. This is consistent with the findings that violence imposes a cost on
exporting. Firms that would gain more from exporting in the first place are more
hampered by violence. Moreover, we show that this effect is likely to be driven by
increase in the cost of production that requires more physical capital and human
capital, rather than by an increase in transportation costs.
2.7 Effects on greenfield investment CAPEX
While the data we have used thus far can help us assess the effects of the war
on drugs on export growth and on the disappearance of export relationships, it
does not allow us to assess the capacity of a locality to attract new projects from
outside investors. For this purpose, we would need a yearly dataset on greenfield
investments that identifies the destination municipality and the magnitude invested
in the project. To our knowledge, such data is not available in Mexican statistical
or administrative sources.
For this reason, we use data from fDi Markets, a service from the Financial
Times with a comprehensive database of crossborder greenfield investments cov-
ering all countries and sectors worldwide, documenting every investments’ capital
29See Mayer and Ottaviano (2008).
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expenditures. From this investment specific dataset we build an aggregate dataset
of the CAPEX received by a Mexican municipality between 2003 and 2006 (pre-
treatment), and between 2007 and 2010 (post-treatment). After restricting our
sample to municipalities with close elections in 2007 or 2008, we retain CAPEX
data for 39 municipalities.30 Table 2.14 shows that regression discontinuity results.
A marginal PAN victory associates with a reduction in CAPEX between 2007 and
2010.
2.8 Conclusion
The Mexican Drug War has drawn the attention of the population, the media
and the academia because of the scale of its consequences. We confirm the results
in Dell (2015), who provides evidence that homicides increase disproportionately in
municipalities where the rollout of the war effort was supported by PAN mayors.
We take a step further and assess how the Drug War affected the real economy.
We document a negative change in trade patterns, with export growth decreasing
significantly after a close PAN win. We argue that a direct, reduced-form approach
would yield lower-bound estimates of the negative economic effects of increased
violence. To support this assumption we provide placebo estimates on previous
elections, regions without ex-ante baseline Cartel presence, and regions facing ex-
ante low violence. Our findings support the assumption that the direct negative
economic effects of narrow PAN victories only occur in the context of the Mexican
Drug War. We interpret our results as evidence of external effects of violence, as
effects are not observed outside the temporal and geographic context of the Drug
War.
The economic literature has studied the effects of violence on economic outcomes.
However, it is difficult to separate the effects on demand and supply. Our paper also
contributes to the literature in terms of identification. By combining close elections
and comparing exports of the same product to the same destination, we are able
to disentangle effects on supply and demand, and study show violence affects the
30We expand the electoral bandwidth to 10% in order to gain more observations and reduce the
variance in the estimates.
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capacity of firms to serve external markets.
We also provide new evidence on the relationship between violence and trade.
Using firm-level microdata, we find that firms locating in a municipality that was
exposed to a PAN mayor faced lower export growth rates, but we do not find a higher
probability of firm exit from product-country markets. This is consistent with the
view that violence increases the marginal costs of exporting, but does not affect
significantly the fixed costs of sustaining trading relationships. Additionally, we
find that the effects are stronger for larger exporters, as well as for exports of more
complex, more capital-intensive, more skill-intensive and more finance-dependent
products. Therefore, violence affects sectors that are key for future economic op-
portunities.
The main results suggest that violence can negatively affect trade at the local
level. Importantly, the increase in violence was a consequence of government policy.
In the case of Mexico, the Drug War policy did not only cost lives, but damaged the
export capacity of firms in the most affected locations.
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2.9 Figures
Figure 2.1: Annual homicides
Notes: This figure shows the time series of total homicides in Mexico. The grey area shows total homicides during
Calderón’s presidency; i.e, during the implementation of the war on drugs.
Figure 2.2: Spatial distribution of homicides
Panel A. Total homicides 2007-2011 Panel B. Change 2007-2011 and 2001-2006
Notes: Panel A depicts the geographical distribution of total homicides between 2007 and 20011 per 100,000
inhabitants. Panel B depicts total homicides between 2007 and 2011 minus total homicides between 2001 and 2006,
per 100,000 inhabitants. It is not possible to compute growth rates or logs because many municipalities have zero
homicides.
90
Chapter 2
Figure 2.3: Spatial distribution of of electoral outcomes
Panel A. All municipalities Panel B. Spread 5%
Notes: Panel A depicts the geographical distribution of PAN victories and losses in the 2007 and 2008 local elections.
Panel B depicts PAN victories and losses by a margin smaller than 5%.
Figure 2.4: Cumulative Homicides as a function of PAN electoral share
Notes: RDD graph on cumulative homicides as a function of direct electoral shares for PAN in a Mexican munic-
ipality. The graph weights homicides by Population in 2005. Confidence intervals are presented at a 95% level.
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Figure 2.5: Log Export growth as a function of PAN electoral share
Notes: RDD graph on log export growth as a function of direct electoral shares for PAN in a Mexican municipality.
The graph weights log export growth by Population in 2005. Confidence intervals are presented at a 95% level. The
data for exports is formed by triples of municipality, product, and country of destination.
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2.10 Tables
Table 2.1: Baseline Characteristics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total sample Spread 5%
P-value P-value
All PAN won PAN lost means diff. PAN won PAN lost means diff.
Panel A: Characteristics Baseline
Population 2005 35019 38396 34270 0.54 59232 42934 0.44
(97487) (126163) (89949) (190580) (103344)
Population ages 15-29 25.6 26.2 25.5 0 26.2 25.9 0.33
(% of total) (2.5) (2.2) (2.5) (2.3) (2.6)
Population density, 2005 151.9 162.9 149.4 0.61 209.6 188.14 0.75
(381.5) (385.1) (380.8) (465.8) (466.3)
PAN incumbent 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.49 0.31 0.32 0.84
(0.44) (0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.47)
GDP per capita 5740 5996 5683 0.09 6085 6228 0.74
(USD, 2005) (2678) (2942) (2613) (3360) (2759)
Literacy rate ages 95.2 95.6 95.1 0.13 95.5 96.1 0.29
(ages 15-24, 2005) (4.9) (4.1) (5.1) (4.3) (3.2)
Mean years of 5.9 6.1 5.9 0.16 6.1 6.1 0.97
schooling, 2005 (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4) (1.4)
Mean Homicides, 2006 11.77 9.31 12.31 0.04 12.03 12.66 0.86
Per 100 Population (20.75) (19.09) (21.07) (20.77) (21.62)
Observations 1416 257 1159 87 111
Panel B: Trade Baseline
Total exports 52.5 81 46.1 0.14 178.6 71.5 0.35
(340) (681.6) (195.7) (1160.4) (259.2)
Exports: number of 19 19.5 18.9 0.71 22.6 22.6 1
countries (19.9) (22.5) (19.3) (27.2) (23.6)
Exports: number of 2.2 2.5 2.1 0.07 3.2 2.6 0.4
products per country (2.8) (4.1) (2.4) (6.1) (3.7)
Total imports 29.7 59.9 23 0.04 147.6 50.5 0.31
(266.2) (570.2) (120.3) (971) (229.6)
Imports: number of 7.7 8.4 7.5 0.45 11.4 10.7 0.82
countries (16.7) (20.1) (15.8) (27.4) (19.7)
Imports: number of 2.8 3.3 2.7 0.11 4.7 3.6 0.35
products per country (5.5) (6.8) (5.2) (9.6) (7)
Observations 1416 257 1159 87 111
Notes: Columns 1-3 report means for all municipalities in which elections occurred in 2007 and 2008. Columns 5-6
restrict the sample to municipalities where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%. Columns 4, and 7 report
p-values of t-tests on the difference in means between the PAN win and PAN loss sample. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses.
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Table 2.2: Effect on homicides, 5% spread
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election (2007 and 2008 elections)
PAN win 25.90** 41.22** 41.22*
(12.65) (18.98) (19.79)
Linear polynomial No Yes Yes
Cluster: state level No No Yes
Observations 198 198 198
R-squared 0.172 0.253 0.253
Panel B: Average homicide 3 years before election (2007 and 2008 elections)
PAN win 3.29 3.76 3.76
(2.71) (4.32) (4.80)
Observations 198 198 198
R-squared 0.030 0.034 0.034
Panel C: Average homicide 3 years after election minus 3 years before election
(2007 and 2008 elections)
PAN win 22.61** 37.47** 37.47**
(10.80) (16.62) (16.81)
Observations 198 198 198
R-squared 0.179 0.301 0.301
Panel D: Placebo, average homicides 3 years after election (2004 and 2005 elections)
PAN win -5.08** -0.81 -0.81
(2.22) (3.09) (2.35)
Observations 247 247 247
R-squared 0.095 0.122 0.122
Notes: Columns 1-3 report standard WLS regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. The
dependent variable in panels A and D is average annual homicides per 100,000 population in the three years following
local elections; in panel B the dependent variable is average annual homicides per 100,000 population in the three
years preceding local elections; and in panel C the dependent variable is the difference between the dependent
variables of panels A and B. In panels A, B and C, the sample is comprised of municipalities where PAN won or
lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections. These are the elections at the beginning of the
Drug War (the treatment period). In panels D, the sample is comprised of municipalities where PAN won or lost by
a margin smaller than 5% in the 2004 and 2005 elections. These are the elections before the Drug War (a placebo
period). Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.3: Total exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Exports
PAN win -0.24*** -0.54*** -0.56*** -0.45***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.06)
Linear RD Polynomial No Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination dummies No No Yes No
Product-country of destination dummies No No No Yes
Observations 21,435 21,435 21,424 18,267
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.58
Notes: Columns 1-4 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. In panel A, the dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total
exports in the final year of the new incumbent’s term, divided by total exports in the year when elections took
place. The sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by
a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over
the new incumbent’s term.
Table 2.4: Placebo
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Exports, placebo 2004-2005 Elections
PAN win -0.11*** -0.12 -0.13 -0.21
(0.03) (0.09) (0.10) (0.14)
Linear RD Polynomial No Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination FE No No Yes No
Product-country of destination FE No No No Yes
Observations 17,058 17,508 17,495 14,682
R-squared 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.60
Notes: Columns 1-4 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports in
the second year of the new incumbent’s term, divided by total exports in the year when elections took place. We
choose the second year because the third year takes place in the middle of the war, which could contaminate the
estimates. The sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination-product where: (i) PAN won or
lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2004 and 2005 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive.
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Table 2.5: Log export growth geterogeneity by municipalities with
pre-existing propensity to drug trafficking
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: North
PAN win -0.62*** -0.63*** -0.40***
(0.17) (0.15) (0.07)
Observations 17,068 17,053 14,120
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.59
Panel B: South
PAN win 0.13* 0.14** 0.11
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09)
Observations 4,367 4,349 2,790
R-squared 0.00 0.10 0.80
Panel C: Pre-existing cartel presence
PAN win -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.46***
(0.10) (0.09) (0.07)
Observations 16,923 16,910 13,798
R-squared 0.01 0.02 0.42
Panel D: No pre-existing cartel presence
PAN win -0.11 -0.13* 0.09**
(0.08) (0.07) (0.04)
Observations 4,273 4,256 3,084
R-squared 0.00 0.08 0.67
Linear RD Polynomial Yes Yes Yes
Country of destination FE No Yes No
Product-country of destination FE No No Yes
Notes: Columns 1-3 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports in
the final year of the new incumbent’s term, divided by total exports in the year when elections took place. The
sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin
smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over the new
incumbent’s term. In panels A and B, the sample is divided into two parts using the median of the (average) latitude
of the municipalities. In panel A, we report results for the northern municipalities, while in Panel B we report results
for the southern municipalities. In Panel C we report effects in municipalities with pre-existing cartel participation
(as identified by Coscia and Rios (2012)). In Panel D we report effects in municipalities with no pre-existing cartel
activity.
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Table 2.6: Exports per quartile of product complexity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1st quartile (low) 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 4th quartile (high)
PAN win -0.07 0.11 -0.17 -0.32 -0.68*** -0.32*** -0.88*** -0.65***
(0.25) (0.34) (0.14) (0.23) (0.06) (0.05) (0.29) (0.11)
Linear RD Polynom. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Destination FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
Product-destin. FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 3,899 3,535 3,790 3,220 4,695 4,011 5,306 4,418
R-squared 0.10 0.58 0.06 0.57 0.06 0.60 0.05 0.59
Notes: All columns report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. Standard
errors are clustered at the municipality level. The dependent variable is the natural logarithmic of total exports in
the final year of the new incumbent’s term, divided by total exports in the year when elections took place. The
sample is comprised of triples municipality-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin
smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over the new
incumbent’s term. Products are divided in 1241 categories. We divide the 1241 products in four groups according
to their complexity as defined by the Atlas of Economic Complexity.
Table 2.7: Firm-level regressions for municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log export growth between 2007-2010, Close Elections from 2007/2008
PAN win -0.14*** -0.14** -0.14*** -0.21** -0.22**
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 17,348 17,348 17,348 17,348 14,647
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.12
Country of destination FE No Yes No No No
Product FE No No Yes No No
Product-country of dest. FE No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No No No Yes
Notes: Columns 1-5 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample is
comprised of triples firms-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%
in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over the new incumbent’s term.
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Table 2.8: Long-term intensive-margin regression and extensive-margin
regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Log growth factor of exports between 2007-2013, Close Elections 2007/2008
PANwin -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.13** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)
Observations 14,264 14,264 14,264 14,264 12,223
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.12
Panel B: Relationship disappearance between 2007-2010, Close Elections 2007/2008
PANwin -0.04 -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 0.05
(0.09) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06)
Observations 41,900 41,900 41,900 41,900 34,539
R-squared 0.01 0.12 0.08 0.29 0.29
Panel C: Relationship disappearance between 2007-2013, Close Elections 2007/2008
PANwin -0.08 -0.10* -0.09 -0.08 0.05
(0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.04)
Observations 41,900 41,900 41,900 41,900 34,539
R-squared 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.27 0.28
Country of destination FE No Yes No No No
Product FE No No Yes No No
Product-country of dest. FE No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No No No Yes
Notes: Columns 1-5 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. In Panel A, the
sample is comprised of triples firms-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller
than 5% in the 2007 and 2008 elections. for the intensive margin the second condition (ii) is that the dependent
variable for the triple is positive over the period after the election. For the extensive margin regressions – Panels B
and C – we show whether a firm stopped exporting afterwards.
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Table 2.9: Firm-level regressions for placebo municipalities with close
elections in 2004/2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Log export growth between 2007-2010, Close Elections from 2004/2005
PAN win 0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.01 0.15*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Observations 13,201 13,201 13,201 13,201 11,569
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.15 0.12
Panel B: Log export growth between 2004-2007, Close Elections from 2004/2005
PAN win 0.05** 0.01 0.09*** 0.11* -0.10**
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
Obs 16,601 16,601 16,601 16,601 14,113
Rsq 0.00 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.12
Country of destination FE No Yes No No No
Product FE No No Yes No No
Product-country of dest. FE No No No Yes Yes
Industry FE No No No No Yes
Notes: Columns 1-5 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample is
comprised of triples firms-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%
in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over the new incumbent’s term.
Table 2.10: Regression in municipalities with and without baseline cartel
presence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log growth exports from 2007/2010, Close Elections 2007/2008
PANwin -0.216** -2.976 -0.209** -0.281
(0.0885) (2.825) (0.0868) (1.174)
Observations 15939 1409 14170 95
R-squared 0.135 0.899 0.115 0.546
Panel B: Log growth exports from 2004/2007, Close Elections 2004/2005 (placebo)
PANwin 0.00448 0.346 0.177* 3.776
(0.0938) (0.716) (0.0869) (2.897)
Observations 12772 429 11340 104
R-squared 0.145 0.771 0.117 0.522
Product-country of dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes
Cartel Present Absent Present Absent
Notes: Columns 1-4 report OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample is comprised
of triples firms-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007
and 2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over the new incumbent’s term. We measure
cartel presence in before the relevant election using data constructed by Coscia and Rios (2012). The variable cartels
is a dummy that determines whether there was cartel presence in a municipality.
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Table 2.11: Regressions in northern and southern municipalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Log growth exports from 2007/2010, Close Elections from 2007/2008
PANwin -0.149** 0.870 -0.267** 0.992
(0.0665) (2.223) (0.0966) (0.625)
Observations 15,682 1,627 14,033 261
R-squared 0.128 0.816 0.114 0.500
Panel B: Log growth exports from 2004/2007, Close Elections from 2004/2005 (placebo)
PANwin 0.140 0.454** 0.538* -
(0.101) (0.110) (0.213) -
Observations 9,479 71 8,197 20
R-squared 0.172 0.931 0.135 -
Product-country of dest. FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE No No Yes Yes
North Yes No Yes No
Notes: Columns 1-4 report OLS regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. The sample is
comprised of triples firms-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5%
in the 2007 and 2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over the new incumbent’s term.
To measure North and South we divide municipalities by separating Mexico in two areas using the median latitude.
The variable North is a dummy that determines whether the location was above or below the median latitude.
Table 2.12: Correlation in product-level complexity and input dependence
Human External
Product Capital Capital Finance Trucking
Complexity Dependence Dependence Dependence Dependence
Product Complexity 1
Capital Dep. 0.79 1
Human Capital Dep. 0.71 0.8 1
External Finance Dep. 0.36 0.28 0.25 1
Trucking Dep. -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 -0.38 1
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Table 2.13: Heterogeneity in effects by exporter size and product groups (complexity and input dependence)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Panel A: Log growth factor of exports between 2007-2010, Close Elections from 2007/2008, Country/Product Fixed Effects
PANwin -0.27*** -0.04 -0.27*** -0.12 -0.32*** -0.06 -0.21** -0.19 -0.27** -0.12 0.06 -0.38***
(0.09) (0.25) (0.08) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.120) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.04)
Obs 15,706 1,550 12,523 4,733 11,047 6,209 12,329 4,927 11,658 5,598 6,759 10,497
Rsq 0.16 0.39 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.12 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.15
Segment Large Small High Low High Capital Low Capital High Finance Low Finance High Human Low Human High Low
Exporters Exporters Complexity Complexity Dependence Dependence Dependence Dependence Capital Capital Trucking Trucking
Dependence Dependence Dependence
Panel B: Log growth factor of exports between 2007-2010, Close Elections from 2007/2008, Country/Product and Industry Fixed Effects
PANwin -0.23*** 0.19 -0.27** 0.01 -0.34** 0.00 -0.23*** -0.13 -0.26*** -0.04 0.18 -0.47***
(0.09) (0.35) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.08) (0.15) (0.09) (0.17) (0.13) (0.10)
Obs 13,284 1,027 10,558 3,959 9,243 5,266 10,307 4,215 9,803 4,709 5,623 8,880
Rsq 0.12 0.35 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.16 0.12 0.13
Segment Large Small High Low High Capital Low Capital High Finance Low Finance High Human Low Human High Low
Exporters Exporters Complexity Complexity Dependence Dependence Dependence Dependence Capital Capital Trucking Trucking
Dependence Dependence Dependence
Notes: Columns 1-12 report OLS regressions. The sample is comprised of triples firms-country of destination-product where (i) PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and
2008 elections and (ii) the value exported for the triple is positive over the new incumbent’s term. We divide below and above median by product characteristics. Product Complexity: This
metric from Hausmann et al. (2013) empirically approximates the diversity on the productive capacities required to export a product competitively from a given country. Capital dependence:
This metric from Shirotori et al. (2010) captures the Revealed Capital Intensity of the product from international trade patterns and national capital endowments of their competitive exporters.
Human capital dependence: Also from Shirotori et al. (2010), this measure captures the Revealed Human Capital Intensity of the product from international trade and national human capital
endowment patterns.Finance dependence: This metric from Kaplan and Zingales (1997) and subsequent work by Lamont et al. (2001), measures a product’s dependence in external capital for
its production. Trucking dependence: We build this metric according to a product’s appeared dependence on trucking services as measured in the US input-output tables.
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Table 2.14: Regression on local greenfield CAPEX
(1) (2)
Greenfield CAPEX (MM US$), Close Elections from 2007/2008
PANwin -2,294** -378.4
(891.5) (628.4)
Observations 21 18
R-squared 0.522 0.051
Specification 2007-2010 2004-2007
Notes: Observations are total CAPEX investments by municipality in each period. Columns 1-2 report WLS
regressions, where the weight is given by the 2005 Population. Standard errors are robust. Column (1) shows the
effect of a close PAN win in the period after the drug war. Column (2) shows the effect of a close PAN win in the
elections before (placebo).
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2.11 Appendix
Table 2.15: Effect on homicides, 3% spread
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election
PAN win 28.97** 47.91** 47.91**
(13.87) (18.87) (19.36)
Linear polynomial No Yes Yes
Cluster: state level No No Yes
Observations 123 123 123
R-squared 0.185 0.306 0.306
Panel B: Average homicide 3 years before election
PAN win 4.23 2.40 2.40
(3.15) (4.57) (4.85)
R-squared 0.049 0.057 0.057
Panel C: Average homicide 3 years after election
minus 3 years before election
PAN win 24.74** 45.51*** 45.51**
(11.75) (17.29) (18.01)
R-squared 0.182 0.340 0.340
Notes: Columns 1-3 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. The dependent
variable in panel A is average annual homicides per 100,000 population in the three years following local elections;
in panel B the dependent variable is average annual homicides per 100,000 population in the three years preceding
local elections; and in Panel C the dependent variable is the difference between the panel the dependent variables of
panels A and B. For all regressions, the sample is comprised of municipalities where PAN won or lost by a margin
smaller than 3% in the 2007 and 2008 elections. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.16: Effect on homicides, RD polynomials
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election, 5% spread
PAN win 41.22* 52.98*** 53.04** 68.11**
(19.79) (17.57) (21.86) (23.88)
Degree of RD polynomial 1st 2nd 3rd 4th
Observations 198 198 198 198
R-squared 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.33
Panel A: Average homicide 3 years after election, total sample
PAN win 14.86 24.61** 31.65* 47.36**
(9.94) (11.46) (15.61) (22.20)
Observations 1,416 1,416 1,416 1,416
R-squared 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05
Notes: Columns 1-4 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. The dependent
variable is average annual homicides per 100,000 population in the three years following local elections. In Panel A,
the sample is comprised of municipalities where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2007 and 2008
elections. In Panel B the sample is comprised of all municipalities in which elections occurred in 2007 and 2008. All
standard errors are clustered at the state level.
Table 2.17: Effect on other crimes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Robbery (business establishments) Panel B: Assaults
PAN win 46.5 68.5 142.9** 192.8
(35.284) (45.864) (66.821) (119.079)
Linear polynomial No Yes No Yes
Observations 139 139 139 139
R-squared 0.106 0.143 0.175 0.235
Panel C: Extortion Panel D: Kidnapping
PAN win 1.7 4.7* 0.3 1.4
(2.189) (2.646) (0.643) (1.026)
R-squared 0.026 0.169 0.006 0.098
Panel E: Robbery (banks branches, Panel F: Robbery (all cases, excluding
cash-in-transit vehicles) business and banks)
PAN win 1.3 2.8* 455.0 917.1***
(0.865) (1.616) (299.769) (345.038)
R-squared 0.118 0.323 0.123 0.217
Notes: Columns 1-4 report weighted regressions. Weights are determined by population size in 2005. In all panels
the dependent variables are averages of a certain crime type per 100,000 population in 2011. In panel A the
dependent variable is robberies that targeted business establishments (including cargo theft); in Panel B, assaults;
in panel C, extortions; in Panel D, kidnapping; in Panel E, robberies that targeted bank branches and cash-in-transit
vehicles; and in Panel F, robberies (excluding business and banks). For all regressions, the sample is comprised of
municipalities where crime data is available and where PAN won or lost by a margin smaller than 5% in the 2004
and 2005 elections. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
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Table 2.18: Product complexity
Lowest complexity
• Natural rubber, balata, gutta-percha, guayule, chicle and similar natural gums, in primary
forms or in plates, sheets or strip
• Cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted
• Coconuts, Brazil nuts and cashew nuts, fresh or dried, whether or not shelled or peeled
• Bananas and plantains, fresh or dried
• Woven fabrics of jute or of other textile bast fibers of heading 5303
• Jute and other textile bast fibers (excluding flax, true hemp and ramie), raw or processed
but not spun; tow and waste of these fibers (including yarn waste and garnetted stock)
• Sisal and Agave, raw
• Coconut, abaca (Manila hemp or Musa textilis Nee), ramie and other vegetable textile
fibers,not elsewhere specified or included, raw or processed but not spun; tow, noils and
waste of these fibers (including yarn waste and garnetted stock)
• Cassava (manioc), arrowroot, salep, Jerusalem artichokes, sweet potatoes and similar roots
and tubers with high starch or inulin content, fresh, chilled, frozen or dried, whether or not
sliced or in the form of pellets; sago pith
• Hats and other headgear, knitted or crocheted, or made up from lace, felt or other textile
fabric, in the piece (but not in strips), whether or not lined or trimmed; hair-nets of any
material, whether or not lined or trimmed
Highest complexity
• Vegetable parchment, greaseproof papers, tracing papers and glassine and other glazed
transparent or translucent papers, in rolls or sheets
• Machines and appliances for testing the hardness, strength, compressibility, elasticity or
other mechanical properties of materials (for example, metals, wood, textiles, paper, plas-
tics), and parts and accessories thereof
• Machine tools for working any material by removal of material, by laser or other light or
photon beam, ultrasonic, electro-discharge, electro-chemical, electron-beam, ionic-beam or
plasma arc processes
• Lubricating preparations (including cutting-oil preparations, bolt or nut release prepara-
tions, antirust or anticorrosion preparations and mold release preparations, based on lubri-
cants) and preparations of a kind used for oil or grease treatment
• Lathes (including turning centers) for removing metal
• Machining centers, unit construction machines (single station) and multistation transfer
machines, for working metal
• Microscopes other than optical microscopes; diffraction apparatus; parts and accessories
thereof
• Flat-rolled products of stainless steel, of a width of less than 600 mm
• Photographic plates and film, exposed and developed, other than motion-picture film
• Nickel tubes, pipes and tube or pipe fittings (for example, couplings, elbows,sleeves)
Notes: Using data for 2007, this table reports the 10 products with highest complexity and the 10 products with
lowest complexity.
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Inheritance taxation in a model of
credit rationing and occupational
choice
Bernardo Ricca
3.1 Introduction
Initial wealth plays a key role in models of credit rationing. For instance, Holm-
ström and Tirole (1997) show that, in the presence of moral hazard, individuals must
have enough wealth in order to obtain credit and become entrepreneurs; individuals
that do not have enough wealth are credit rationed and have to pursue different oc-
cupations. This feature of the model renders initial wealth critical. Since, to some
extent, initial wealth is determined by bequests, studying the implications of inher-
itance taxation in this environment may be of interest. The study of inheritance
taxation and other redistributive policies has gained relevance as researchers have
documented an increase in inequality in a broad set of countries.1 Concomitantly,
there is an intense public debate about the topic.2
1See, among others, Alvaredo et al. (2013), Atkinson et al. (2011), and Piketty (2014)
2In the US, some politicians proposed legislation to repeal the federal estate tax in January
2019 (see https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/215/text). On the
other side, also in January 2019, some politicians advocated an increase in this type of taxation, es-
pecially for the rich (see https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/309/
106
Chapter 3
I extend the Holmström and Tirole (1997) model to a dynastic model in which
parents bequeath to their children and individuals choose their occupation. Apart
from heterogeneity in the initial wealth of the first generation, individuals are homo-
geneous and treat bequests as a consumption good. The combination of borrowing
constraints and a fixed investment technology results in conditional convergence:
individuals converge to different steady-states depending on their initial wealth. In
particular, individuals that start poor cannot access more profitable occupations,
and tend to remain poor in the long run, that is, poverty traps may occur.
The introduction of a government that taxes bequests and transfers the proceeds
to the population has important implications. On the one hand, bequest taxation
affects entrepreneurs’ effort choice (moral hazard): they have more incentives to
misbehave because, in case of success, outcomes must be shared with the creditors
(that have to break even) and the government. Therefore, the initial wealth thresh-
old that determines which individuals have access to credit increases with the tax
rate. On the other hand, an individual might receive a lump-sum transfer from the
government. Therefore, the government can affect the distribution of wealth and
thus the occupations available to each agent. Investors that would not be credit
rationed in the absence of taxation can now be credit rationed. If the social planner
transfers the taxes to the less wealthy, investors that were credit rationed can now
have enough wealth to be granted a loan and become an entrepreneur.
I show that the introduction of taxes creates, at least in the short run, an equity
efficiency trade-off. While redistribution reduces inequality, GDP per capita is de-
pleted because taxation increases the threshold required to become an entrepreneur,
and thus the number of entrepreneurs decreases. However, in the long run (steady-
state) this trade-off is not always present and the policy can achieve both a reduction
in inequality and a maximization of aggregate productivity. That is, for some set
of parameters, there exists a redistributive policy that generates a steady-state in
which all individuals are entrepreneurs, there is no inequality, and GDP per capita
is maximized. This outcome would be the optimal policy in a society that only cares
about steady-state social welfare. However, this is not the case if the social welfare
includes all time periods, as relatively rich individuals are worse off in the short run.
all-info).
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The optimal policy in this case would depend on Pareto weights.
The interplay between wealth inequality, borrowing constraints and the process
of development has been explored by the occupational choice literature in devel-
opment economics. Even though taxation is not the focus of the early papers in
this field, they do analyse the impact of taxes, and policy prescriptions vary accord-
ing to features of the models. In Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Ghatak and
Jiang (2002), individuals have the same preferences and have access to the same
technologies, but they start their lives with different levels of wealth. They live
for one period and treat bequests as a consumption good. Borrowing constraints
arise from imperfect enforceability, and nonconvexities in the production technology
result in multiple steady-states, including poverty traps: dynasties that start poor
tend to remain poor. Inheritance taxation and transfers targeted at the poor can
alleviate the occurrence of poverty traps. However, these papers do not explicitly
model taxes and its endogenous implications. In particular, borrowing constraints
are not directly affected by taxation. In Ghatak et al. (2001) agents can work and
save before becoming entrepreneurs. Labor markets are subject to moral hazard
and poor individuals are motivated to work hard when ‘young’ to build up wealth
that would allow them to overcome borrowing constraints and undertake profitable
projects when ‘old’. Redistributive policies can dampen the incentives of the ‘young’
workers and result in an decrease in social welfare. In Aghion and Bolton (1997),
individuals live for one period, and cannot build up wealth through thrift and hard
work. Moral hazard leads to borrowing constraints. They argue that redistributive
policies are efficiency-enhancing since they reduce the amount borrowed by the poor,
and therefore their incentives to maximize profits are less distorted.
More recently, Cagetti and De Nardi (2009) explicitly study taxation in a model
that features occupational choice and borrowing constraints. Their approach differs
from Piketty and Saez (2013), who study optimal inheritance taxation in a model
where occupation is not a choice variable. Cagetti and De nardi (2009) develop and
calibrate a rich model in which individuals are perfectly altruistic and borrowing
constraints arise from imperfect enforceability. Individuals have heterogeneous en-
trepreneurial and working abilities, and when they decide to be entrepreneurs they
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choose the size of their firms, in the sense that they can hire an arbitrary number
of employers. They find that estate taxation has a small effect on the saving and
investment decisions of small business, but it distorts the decisions of larger firms,
which has a negative effect on total output.
The empirical literature on this topic is small. The most related paper is Tsout-
soura (2015), who studies a policy that reduces succession taxes in Greece. She
shows that, in the context of family firms, succession taxes cause a decrease in post-
succession investment. Effects are larger for firms with low asset tangibility and for
entrepreneurs that have low income from other activities. This evidence is consistent
with the tightening of borrowing constraints due to the taxation.
3.2 Model
3.2.1 Demography, preferences and technologies
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of measure one of infinitely
lived dynasties, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. In a given period of time, each dynasty is
represented by a single individual, indexed by (i, t), who is risk-neutral, lives for one
period and has preferences over consumption, bequests received by their children
(that is, net of inheritance taxation) and effort. The treatment of bequests as a
consumption good is known as joy-of-giving or warm-glow motive. There are other
alternative bequest motives, for instance individuals of one generation may care
about the welfare of the next generation (altruistic preferences), or individuals may
not derive utility from bequests, but they end up bequeathing their estate because
their lifespan is uncertain (accidental bequests). Kopczuk (2013) points out that
in practice different bequest motives are not exclusive (e.g. accidental bequests
may coexist with joy-of-giving), and that different individuals may have different
preferences for bequests. The choice of the joy-of-giving motive is due to tractability,
and the results are limited to this case.
At the beginning of their lives, individuals are endowed with one unit of labor
and an initial wealth Ai,t determined by bequests bi,t−1 and lump-sum transfers gi,t,
that is, Ai,t = bi,t−1 + gi,t. Initial wealth of the first generation, {Ai,0}i∈[0,1], is
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exogenously given.
Following Banerjee and Newman (1993), I assume that all individuals have iden-
tical Cobb-Douglas utility functions over consumption and bequests. The disutility
of effort is given by a function h : {eL, eH} → R. More specifically, utility functional
form is given by u(c, b, e) = δ−1c1−αbα − h(e), where c denotes consumption, b be-
quests received by the next generation, e effort, α ∈ (0, 1) and δ = αα(1 − α)1−α.
The multiplication by δ−1 is without loss of generality, and aims at simplifying the
indirect utility function. Denoting income realization by y and the inheritance tax
rate by τ , each individual chooses c and b by solving
max
(c,b)∈R2+
δ−1c1−αbα − h(e)
s.t. c+
1
1− τ b ≤ y
where 1
1−τ b is the amount left as bequests, implying that after taxation the next
generation receives b.3 We can view 1
1−τ as the relative price of bequests, which
is increasing in τ . The optimal choices of consumption and bequests are given by
c∗ = (1 − α)y and b∗ = α(1 − τ)y, yielding the following indirect utility function:
(1 − τ)αy − h(e). If τ = 0 or α = 0 we are back to the set-up of Holmström and
Tirole (1997).
There are two production technologies available to all individuals. One tech-
nology uses no capital and one unit of labor to produce q > 0 units of output,
irrespective of the amount of effort. An individual that uses this technology will
be dubbed self-employed. The other technology is a risky project, and an individ-
ual that undertakes it will be dubbed an entrepreneur. As in Holmström and Tirole
(1997), this project requires I > 0 units of capital and one unit of labor. The project
yields R > 0 in case of success and 0 otherwise. It is subject to moral hazard. An
individual can exert high effort (eH) or low effort (eL). If she exerts high effort the
probability of success is pH , and the disutility is h(eH) = B > 0; if she exerts low
effort the probability of success is pL, where pL < pH , and the disutility is h(eL) = 0.
3One could think of a tax t that is levied on the amount received by the next generation. In
this case, the budget constraint would be c + (1 + t)b ≤ y. We have the following relationship:
t = τ1−τ .
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I assume that the project’s net present value is negative when e = eL and that when
τ = 0 the gain (in utility) of becoming an entrepreneur is bigger than the gain of a
self-employed worker.
Assumption 1. pHR− I −B > q > 0 and pLR− I < 0
If I > Ai,t, individual i must borrow to undertake the project. Potential lenders
cannot observe effort choices, are risk-neutral, behave competitively and have the
amount necessary to finance all the projects. Since the project has a negative net
present value when e = eL, any contract between a lender and an entrepreneur must
be designed in a way that high effort is incentivized. Denoting by RB the amount
received by the borrower in case of success, the incentive compatibility constraint is
pH(1− τ)αRB −B ≥ pL(1− τ)αRB or RB ≥ RB(τ) = B
∆p(1− τ)α (3.1)
where ∆p = pH−pL > 0. The introduction of taxes increases the minimum payment
required to incentivize high effort, RB(τ), which is increasing in both α and τ when
τ ∈ (0, 1), in the sense that its partial derivatives are positive. Even though b∗
is decreasing in τ , government’s revenue, τb∗/(1 − τ) = ταy, is increasing in τ .
Therefore an increase in τ leads to a larger share of R allocated to the government,
which disincentivizes high effort. An increase in α, keeping τ ∈ (0, 1) fixed, means
that individuals care more about bequests and results in an increase in b∗. A higher
b∗ increases the government’s stake in case of success, and thus effort becomes less
attractive. It must be noted that if τ is very high, RB will be larger than R,
which is not feasible, meaning that the entrepreneur will always choose to exert eL.
Therefore, we have the following constraint for τ :
RB ≤ R⇐⇒ τ ≤ 1−
(
B
∆pR
) 1
α
(3.2)
Expected pledgeable income is given by:
P = pH
[
R− B
∆p(1− τ)α
]
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Lenders must break even, thus it should be the case that:
P = pH
[
R− B
∆p(1− τ)α
]
≥ I − Ai,t
or
Ai,t ≥ A(τ) = pH B
∆p(1− τ)α − (pHR− I) (3.3)
Thus, only investors with initial wealth greater than A(τ) can secure financ-
ing and undertake the project. A(τ) is increasing in τ when τ ∈ (0, 1), that is,
taxes reduce the set of individuals that are eligible to borrow. I make the following
assumption to ensure that credit rationing takes place even in the absence of taxes.
Assumption 2. A(0) = pH B∆p − (pHR− I) > 0
Since lenders behave competitively, they make no profits, and the amount RL
that they receive must satisfy
pHRL = I − Ai,t or RL = I − Ai,t
pH
(3.4)
If Ai,t ≥ A(τ), RB = R − RL ≥ RB(τ) = B/[∆p(1 − τ)α], and the incentive-
compatibility constraint is satisfied. To sum up, there are two possible types of
occupation: entrepreneurship and self-employment. The realized income of an indi-
vidual that becomes an entrepreneur and has initial wealth Ai,t ≥ I is y = R−I+Ai,t
in case of success and y = Ai,t−I otherwise; if Ai,t < I, y = R−(I−Ai,t)/pH in case
of success and y = 0 otherwise. The realized income of a self-employed individual is
y = q + Ai,t.
3.2.2 Dynamics with no taxes
When τ = 0, Assumption 1 and the fact that lenders behave competitively imply
that individuals always prefer entrepreneurship. However, only individuals that have
wealth greater than A(0) can choose entrepreneurship, where A(0) = B
∆p
−(pHR−I).
Recalling that optimal bequests correspond to a share α(1− τ) of realized income,
initial wealth evolves according to
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Ai,t+1 =

α(Ai,t + q) w.p. 1 if Ai,t < A(0)
0 w.p. 1− pH if A(0) ≤ Ai,t < I
α(R− I−Ai,t
pH
) w.p. pH if A(0) ≤ Ai,t < I
α(Ai,t − I) w.p. 1− pH if Ai,t ≥ I
α(R− I + Ai,t) w.p. pH if Ai,t ≥ I
I make the following assumption throughout the paper to make the model more
tractable.
Assumption 3. If entrepreneurs exert high effort, the probability of success is equal
to 1, pH = 1.
Assumption 3 makes the evolution of wealth deterministic, given by
Ai,t+1 =
 α(Ai,t + q) if Ai,t < A(0)α(R− I + Ai,t) if Ai,t ≥ A(0)
Since α ∈ (0, 1) the two equations determining the evolution of wealth have
unique stationary points, and any stationary distribution takes the form described
below. A mass λ of self-employed individuals with wealth A given by
A = α(A+ q)⇐⇒ A = αq
1− α,
and a mass 1− λ of entrepreneurs with wealth A¯ given by
A¯ = α(R− I + A¯)⇐⇒ A¯ = α(R− I)
1− α ,
By Assumption 1, q < R− I, and A < A¯. We have three possible cases:
λ = 1 if A¯ < A(0) only self-employed
λ ∈ [0, 1] if A < A(0) ≤ A¯ possibly self-employed and entrepreneurs
λ = 0 if A(0) ≤ A only entrepreneurs
To ensure that a stationary distribution can have a positive mass of both en-
trepreneurs and self-employed, it should be the case that A < A(0) ≤ A¯, as described
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in Figure 3.1. The following assumption guarantees that this condition is satisfied.4
Assumption 4. q < 1−α
α
[
B
∆p
− (R− I)
]
and R > (1− α) B
∆p
+ I
Assumption 4 implies that all dynasties that start with wealth smaller than A(0)
will have wealth A in the long run, and λ will be the measure at time 0 of the set
{i ∈ [0, 1] : Ai,0 < A(0)}. Indeed, if Ai,0 < A(0),
Ai,t = α
tAi,0 +
t∑
j=1
αjq ⇒ lim
t→∞
Ai,t = A
A similar argument shows that all dynasties that start with wealth bigger than
A(0) will have wealth A¯ in the long run, and the measure of entrepreneurs in the
steady-state, 1− λ, is the measure at time 0 of the set {i ∈ [0, 1] : Ai,0 ≥ A(0)}.
Dynasties that end up with wealth A can be said to be trapped in poverty. The
technologies available and imperfections in the credit market lead to convergence
conditional on the initial wealth of the first generation, and dynasties that start
poor tend to remain poor. As pointed out by Ghatak (2015), this result differs from
the Solow model, in which no financial frictions and convex technologies result in
unconditional convergence: all agents (or countries) converge to the same level of
wealth irrespective of their initial wealth. Since Assumption 4 implies that poverty
traps occur in the model, tax and transfers policies that aim to eliminate them or,
less ambitiously, reduce wealth inequality, may improve social welfare.
3.3 Redistributive taxation
The government collects taxes at the end of a period and makes lump-sum trans-
fers at the beginning of the next period. It balances its budget, in the sense that
∫ 1
0
gi,t+1di =
∫ 1
0
τi,t
1− τi,t bi,tdi ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }
4Assumptions 1-4 impose a set of restrictions on R. It cannot be very big so that in case of
low effort the project has a positive NPV or individuals with no wealth have access to credit,
R < min{ B∆p + I, IpL }; but it can also not be very small so that all individuals are self-employed
in the steady-state or self-employment yields more utility than entrepreneurship in the absence of
taxes, R > max{(1− α) B∆p + I, I +B + q}.
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where τi,t and gi,t are the the tax rate and lump-sum transfer of individual (i, t).
Apart from the benchmark case with no taxation, I consider two possible simple
tax and transfer structures, which I call structure 1 and structure 2. Structure 1
treats all the agents equally, in the sense that everyone pays the same tax rate and
receives the same lump-sum grant. Structure 2 treats agents differently, in the sense
that transfers are targeted at the poor, and only the rich individuals pay taxes.
Structure 1. All individuals pay the same tax rate τ and receives the same
lump-sum grant, gi,t+1 = gt+1(τ) for all i. The notation emphasizes that the amount
transferred at time t + 1 is a function of τ , but it is worth noting that it also
depends on the wealth distribution at the beginning of period t. Government’s
budget constraint is
gt+1(τ) =
∫ 1
0
τ
1− τ bi,tdi ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }
In this system, an individual prefers entrepreneurship when
(1− τ)α (R− I + Ai,t)−B ≥ (1− τ)α(q + Ai,t) or τ ≤ τ¯ = 1−
(
B
R− I − q
) 1
α
By Assumption 1, R− I − q > B, which implies that τ¯ < 1. Assumption 1 also
guarantees that the constraint given by Equation 3.2 is satisfied when τ < τ¯ .
Structure 2. Only individuals with initial wealth greater than A(τ) pay taxes.
Individuals that receive bequests greater than A(τ) do not receive a transfer; all
individuals that receive bequest smaller than A(τ) receive the same transfer gt+1(τ).
Once all individuals have initial wealth greater than A(τ), taxes no longer serve a
purpose, and I assume that they are set to zero.
Let the function Gt(a) denote the measure of individuals at time t that receive
bequest strictly smaller than a ∈ R. Denoting by Ωt the set of individuals with
initial wealth greater than A(τ) in period t, the government’s the budget constraint
is
gt+1(τ)Gt+1(A(τ)) =
∫
Ωt
τ
1− τ bi,tdi ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . }
Individuals that have enough initial wealth to become entrepreneurs will prefer
entrepreneurship when τ ≤ τ¯ , as in structure 1. I assume throughout the paper that
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the social planner always set τ ≤ τ¯ .
3.3.1 Dynamics
Structure 1. Initial wealth evolves according to
Ai,t+1 =
 α(1− τ)(Ai,t + q) + gt+1(τ) if Ai,t < A(τ)α(1− τ)(R + Ai,t − I) + gt+1(τ) if Ai,t ≥ A(τ)
Since τ(1 − α) < 1, a stationary distribution is characterized by a mass λ1 of
self-employed individuals with wealth A1(τ), a mass 1 − λ1 of entrepreneurs with
wealth A¯1(τ), and transfers g1(τ) given by5
A1(τ) =
α(1− τ)q
1− α(1− τ) +
τα[λ1q + (1− λ1)(R− I)]
(1− α)[1− α(1− τ)] (3.5)
A¯1(τ) =
α(1− τ)(R− I)
1− α(1− τ) +
τα[λ1q + (1− λ1)(R− I)]
(1− α)[1− α(1− τ)] (3.6)
g1(τ) =
τα
1− α [λ1q + (1− λ1)(R− I)] (3.7)
We have the following properties: A1(τ) < A¯1(τ) and when λ1 ∈ (0, 1), A′1(τ) >
0, A¯′1(τ) < 0. In particular, A1(τ) ≥ A and A¯1(τ) ≤ A¯. Even under Assumption
4, there are three possible cases. When there are only entrepreneurs or only self-
employed, the stationary points are the same as those in the case without taxation.

λ1 = 1 only self-employed with wealth A1(τ) = A
λ1 ∈ (0, 1) self-employed with wealth A1(τ) and entrepreneurs with wealth A¯1(τ)
λ1 = 0 only entrepreneurs with wealth A¯1(τ) = A¯
Structure 2. Initial wealth evolves according to6
5The equations are derived in the Appendix.
6Bequests left by self-employed individuals are smaller than A(τ), and thus their offspring are
entitled to receive transfers. To see this note that Assumption 4 can be rewritten as: α[A(0)+q] <
A(0). Since A(0) < A(τ) and α ∈ (0, 1), α[A(τ) + q] < A(τ). If Ai,t < A(τ), then α[Ai,t + q] <
α[A(τ) + q] < A(τ). On the other hand, bequests left by entrepreneurs are bigger than A(τ), and
thus their offspring are not entitled to receive transfers. If Ai,t > A(τ) then α(1−τ)(R+Ai,t−I) =
α(1 − τ)(R − I) + α(1 − τ)Ai,t = [1 − α(1 − τ)]A¯2(τ) + α(1 − τ)Ai,t > A(τ), as both A¯2(τ) and
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Ai,t+1 =
 α(Ai,t + q) + gt+1(τ) if Ai,t < A(τ)α(1− τ)(R + Ai,t − I) if Ai,t ≥ A(τ)
A stationary distribution is characterized by a mass λ2 of self-employed indi-
viduals with wealth A2(τ), a mass 1 − λ2 of entrepreneurs with wealth A¯2(τ), and
transfers g2(τ) given by
A2(τ) =
αq
1− α +
τα(1− λ2)(R− I)
λ2(1− α)[1− α(1− τ)] (3.8)
A¯2(τ) =
α(1− τ)(R− I)
1− α(1− τ) (3.9)
g2(τ) =
τα
λ2[1− α(1− τ)](1− λ2)(R− I) (3.10)
Recalling that when all individuals are entrepreneurs, or all individual are self-
employed, taxes are set to zero, the three cases that applied to structure 1 are also
applicable to structure 2 :

λ2 = 1 only self-employed with wealth A2(τ) = A
λ2 ∈ (0, 1) self-employed with wealth A2(τ) and entrepreneurs with wealth A¯2(τ)
λ2 = 0 only entrepreneurs with wealth A¯2(τ) = A¯
3.3.2 Social planner
We can think of a social planner that chooses a tax structure, that is, {gi,t, τi,t},
to maximize social welfare of all generations. The choice is made at time zero with
full commitment. Denoting Pareto weights by ωi,t ≥ 0, the set of individuals that
pay taxes by Ωt, the set of individuals that receive transfers by Γt, and realized
Ai,t are bigger than A(τ). Assumption 4 guarantees that there exists a positive number k such
that A¯2(τ) ≥ A(τ) for all τ ∈ [0, k]. In the numerical examples of this paper, A¯2(τ) < A(τ) is not
a concern.
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income by yi,t, the social planner problem is
max
∞∑
t=0
∫ 1
0
ωi,t[(1− τi,t)αyi,t − h(ei,t)]di
s.t. (i)
∫
Γt+1
gi,tdi =
∫
Ωt
τ
1− τ bi,tdi ∀t ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . },
(ii) each individual chooses the occupation optimally,
given{Ai,0}i∈[0,1]
We can also think of a social planner that wants to maximize steady-state social
welfare. In this case, there are only two groups of individuals – self-employed and
entrepreneurs– with wealth A and A¯, and Pareto weights ω and 1 − ω. Denoting
by SW1 the maximum social welfare attainable under structure 1, and using the
notation λ1(τ) to make explicit that the proportion of self-employed individuals in
the steady-state depends on the choice of the tax rate and the tax structure, we
have
SW1 = max{τ}
{
ωλ1(τ)
{
(1− τ)α[A1(τ) + q]
}
+
(1− ω)[1− λ1(τ)]
{
(1− τ)α[R− I + A¯1(τ)]−B
}}
, given{Ai,0}i∈[0,1]
where A1(τ) and A¯1(τ) are given by equations 3.5 and 3.6, respectively. Similarly,
denoting by SW2 the maximum social welfare attainable under structure 2, we have
SW2 = max{τ}
{
ωλ2(τ)
{
A2(τ) + q
}
+
(1− ω)[1− λ2(τ)]
{
(1− τ)α[R− I + A¯2(τ)]−B
}}
, given{Ai,0}i∈[0,1]
where A2(τ) and A¯2(τ) are given by equations 3.8 and 3.9, respectively. The de-
pendence of λ1(.) and λ2(.) on the the wealth distribution at time zero makes it
difficult to find a general solution to this problem, and I have to resort to numerical
examples.
If the social planner maximizes steady-state social welfare, the ideal tax structure
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would be such that there are only entrepreneurs in the steady-state, that is, λ1(τ) =
0 in case of structure 1, or λ2(τ) = 0 in case of structure 2.7 Importantly, the
first-bet does not depend on the Pareto weight ω. This outcome, however, is not
always feasible, and a tax structure would only serve the purpose of reducing wealth
inequality in the steady-state. However, inequality reduction comes at a cost: since
taxes tighten borrowing constraints (the threshold increases from A(0) to A(τ)),
they can potentially reduce the mass of entrepreneurs, which negatively affects total
output. In this case, the optimal policy will depend on the Pareto weight ω.
It is worth noting that if the social planner cares about the welfare of all gen-
erations, a policy that generates a steady-state distribution with a mass one of
entrepreneurs might not be optimal, since entrepreneurs experience welfare losses in
the beginning, before all agents have enough wealth to become entrepreneurs.
3.3.3 Numerical examples
Example 1. In this example, I consider structure 1. I show that the introduction
of taxes deplete the productivity of the economy in the short run. This decrease is
due to the fact that taxes increase the wealth required to become an entrepreneur,
and transfers are not enough to turn a large number self-employed individuals into
entrepreneurs. However, if the taxation is large enough, even though the GDP suffers
in the short run, transfers are high enough so that the policy can attain a steady-sate
in which all individuals are entrepreneurs, and thus GDP per capita is maximized.
Figure 3.2 shows how the initial wealth cutoff increases with the tax rate. The
trajectory of GDP per capita and the share of entrepreneurs is illustrated in Figure
3.3. For small tax rates, GDP per capita is always smaller than in the benchmark
case with no taxes. However, when the tax rate is 25%, a steady-state in which all
individuals are entrepreneurs is attained. If the tax rate is 26.5%, the increase in
the tax rate is not enough to offset the reduction in the mass of entrepreneurs, and
the mass of entrepreneurs in the steady-state is again smaller than 1.
Figure 3.4 shows steady-state values. The relationship between tax rate and
GDP per capita has the form of a U-shaped curve. For small values of the tax rate,
7Since transfers are the only government expenditures, taxes are set to zero in both structures
once all agents have the same occupation.
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the policy harms GDP because the mass of entrepreneurs is depleted. However,
if the taxes are high enough, transfers allow self-employed individuals to become
entrepreneurs, and thus GDP starts to increase. If the tax rate is high enough, all
individuals are entrepreneurs in the steady-state. However, after some point, the
increase in the minimum wealth to become an entrepreneur is so severe that again
the mass of entrepreneurs is smaller than 1 in the steady-state.
In Figure 3.5, I plot the steady-state values of the Gini coefficient. In the case
of two levels of income, the coefficient is equal to the proportion of wealth owned
by the entrepreneurs minus the proportion of entrepreneurs. Because, for small
tax rates, the proportion of entrepreneurs decreases more rapidly than the share
of wealth owned by them, the Gini coefficient increases slightly. However, it starts
to decrease and reaches zero when all individuals are entrepreneurs. Figure 5 also
plots the difference between steady-state wealth of entrepreneurs and self-employed.
This measure monotonically decreases with the tax rate, and reaches zero when all
individuals have the same wealth.
Example 2. In example 1, the initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0,10]
and the cutoff to become an entrepreneur in case of no taxation is relatively small,
1. Therefore, there is a large mass of entrepreneurs to be taxed, and thus a steady-
state with a mass 1 of entrepreneurs can be attained with the appropriate tax rate.
However, if the initial distribution is uniformly distributed over [0,3], the initial mass
of entrepreneurs is much smaller, and no tax rate can generate a steady-state with a
mass 1 of entrepreneurs. In such case, redistribution has only one purpose: reducing
inequality. This reduction, however, occurs at the expense of productivity and GDP
per capita. Figure 3.6 shows steady-state values of GDP per capita and the Gini
coefficient. GDP per capita monotonically decreases with the tax rate, while the
Gini coefficient initially increases, but, for appropriate tax rates, it is smaller that
the Gini coefficient with no taxation.
Example 3. Now I show that structure 2 can be a solution in the case in
which initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0,3]. The policy can attain a
steady-state with a mass 1 of entrepreneurs for a broad set of tax rates. If the tax
rate is too small, such that the mass of entrepreneurs is large but the taxes paid
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on each dollar bequeathed are small, or very large, such that the taxes collected
on each dollar bequeathed are large but the mass of entrepreneurs is small, the
policy cannot attain a steady-state with only entrepreneurs. Figure 3.7 shows the
evolution of GDP per capita and the share of entrepreneurs, while Figure 3.8 shows
steady-state values. Figure 3.9 shows steady-state values for the Gini coefficient. In
this case, taxation always decreases the coefficient in comparison to the case with
no taxes.
It is worth noting that, even with structure 2, a steady-state with a mass 1 of
entrepreneurs is not always attainable. For example, this is the case when initial
wealth is uniformly distributed over [0.2]. Apart from tax and transfer structures,
policies that aim at improving the functioning of credit markets are also effective.
If, for example, we interpret B as private benefits, policies that can reduce B render
borrowing constraints less tight, which alleviates the importance of initial wealth
in the occupational choice decision. If the reduction in B is such that A(0) < A
holds, all agents can choose entrepreneurship at some point, and taxes are no longer
needed.
3.4 Conclusion
In the presence of borrowing constraints and a fixed-investment technology, dy-
nasties (or individuals) that start with different levels of wealth converge to different
steady-states. In particular, dynasties that start poor tend to remain poor. In this
case, inheritance taxes and transfers can play an important role. In the model, I en-
dogenize the effect of taxation on credit constraints – there is an increasing relation-
ship between taxes and the initial wealth required to become an entrepreneur. Even
though taxes tighten borrowing constraints and thus deplete the productivity of the
economy in the short run, they can fight poverty traps and wealth inequality. Im-
portantly, in the long run, for some set of parameters, the trade-off equity-efficiency
is not always present. That is, the policy can also attain a situation in which every
individual can choose the most profitable occupation and aggregate productivity is
maximized.
I studied two tax designs. One design, called structure 1, treats people more
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equally, in the sense that all individuals pay the same tax rate and receive the same
lump-sum grant. The other design, called structure 2, treats agents differently, in
the sense that the poor receive grants, and the rich pay taxes. Both structures
can be an effective way of fighting poverty traps, but in general structure 2 does a
better job. In practice, however, structure 2 may face more resistance, as favouring
specific groups to the detriment of others may be politically costly. When structure
1 cannot perform well, and structure 2 is politically unfeasible, policies that aim at
reducing credit market imperfections may be useful.
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3.5 Figures
Figure 3.1: Wealth evolution and its stationary points in the absence of
taxation
Notes: I assume that Assumption 4 is satisfied. Therefore, A < A(0) < A¯.
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Figure 3.2: Initial wealth required to become an entrepreneur as a
function of the tax rate
Notes: I assume that α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
Figure 3.3: Evolution of GDP per capita and mass of entrepreneurs for
different tax rates
Notes: I assume that the government implements structure 1, initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0, 10],
α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
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Figure 3.4: Steady-state values of GDP per capita and mass of
entrepreneurs for different tax rates
Notes: I assume that the government implements structure 1, initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0, 10],
α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
Figure 3.5: Evolution of steady-state levels of the Gini coefficient and the
difference between the highest wealth level and the lowest wealth level
for different tax rates
Notes: I assume that the government implements structure 1, initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0, 10],
α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
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Figure 3.6: Evolution of steady-state levels of GDP per capita and the
Gini coefficient for different tax rates
Notes: I assume that the government implements structure 1, initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0, 3],
α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
Figure 3.7: Evolution of GDP per capita and mass of entrepreneurs for
different tax rates
Notes: I assume that the government implements structure 2, initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0, 3],
α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
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Figure 3.8: Steady-state values of GDP per capita and mass of
entrepreneurs for different tax rates
Notes: I assume that the government implements structure 2, initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0, 3],
α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
Figure 3.9: Evolution of steady-state levels of the Gini coefficient and the
difference between the highest wealth level and the lowest wealth level
Notes: I assume that the government implements structure 2, initial wealth is uniformly distributed over [0, 3],
α = 0.5, R = 10, q = 0.5, B = 3, I = 6, and pL = 0.4.
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3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Stationary distributions
Structure 1 A(τ), A¯(τ) and g(τ) are given by
A(τ) = α(1− τ)(A(τ) + q) + g(τ)⇐⇒ A(τ) = α(1− τ)q + g(τ)
1− α(1− τ) ,
A¯(τ) = α(1− τ)(R + A¯(τ)− I) + g(τ)⇐⇒ A¯(τ) = α(1− τ)(R− I) + g(τ)
1− α(1− τ) ,
g(τ) = τα[λ(A(τ) + q) + (1− λ)(R + A¯(τ)− I)]
Plugging the expressions of A(τ) and A¯(τ) into the expression of g(τ), we obtain
g(τ) =
τα
1− α [λq + (1− λ)(R− I)]
Now plugging this expression of g(τ) into the expressions of A(τ) and A¯(τ) , we
obtain
A(τ) =
α(1− τ)q
1− α(1− τ) +
τα[λq + (1− λ)(R− I)]
(1− α)[1− α(1− τ)]
and
A¯(τ) =
α(1− τ)(R− I)
1− α(1− τ) +
τα[λq + (1− λ)(R− I)]
(1− α)[1− α(1− τ)]
Structure 2 Same procedure.
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